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THE BACK-DOOR TO PRISON: WAIVER
REFORM, "BLENDED SENTENCING," AND

THE LAW OF UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES
MARCY R. PODKOPACZ"AND BARRY C. FELD"

I. INTRODUCTION
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the arrest rates of juveniles for violence and homicide surged dramatically.' The esca• Director of Research, Fourth Judicial District of Minnesota, Hennepin
County.
BA. 1976 Sociology/Criminal Justice, University of Minnesota; MA. 1985 Sociology/Statistics and Methodology, University of Minnesota; Ph.D. 1996 Sociology/Law,
Criminology and Deviance, University of Minnesota.
" Centennial Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
BA. 1966,
University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1969, University of Minnesota Law School; Ph.D. Sociology, Harvard University. Served as Member and Due Process Sub-Committee
Chair of 1992-93 MinnesotaJuvenile Justice Task Force. Served as Co-Reporter 199496 Advisory Committee on the Rules of Procedure forJuvenile Court to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
'F RA1iiN ZmaNG, AmmRICAN YoUTH VIOLENcE 37 (1998); Alfred Blumstein, Youth
Violence, Guns, and the IllicitDrug ndust,, 86J. Cm. L & CImINOLOCY 10, 10 (1995)
[hereinafter Blumstein, Youth Violence] (analyzing changing patterns of age-specific
homicide rates in conjunction with proliferation of guns and illegal drug industry);
PhilipJ. Cook & John H. Laub, The UnprecedentedEpidemic in Youth Violence, 24 COiME
&JuSTICE 27, 28 (1998). Cook and Laub write:
[T]here has been an explosion in the rates at which adolescents commit and are victimized by serious crimes ofviolence. The increase was concentrated among black males: between 1984 and 1993, the homicide victimization rate more than tripled for thirteen- to
seventeen-year-old adolescents, and the homicide-commission rate increased by a factor of
4.5, reaching levels with no precedent in this century.
Id.
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lation of homicide, especially among young African-American
males in the late 1980s, provided the impetus for legislative
strategies to "get tough" and "crack down" on youth crime and
accelerated punitive policy trends to "criminalize" juvenile justice.9 Public fear of youth crime and politicians' desire to "get
tough" motivated policies to transfer more young offenders to
criminal courts for prosecution as adults and to strengthen the
sanctioning powers of juvenile courts.3 During the early 1990s,

The juvenile violence and homicide arrest rates increased at a faster pace than
those of adults, and the average age ofjuvenile arrestees decreased. Alfred Blumstein
& Daniel Cork, Linking Gun Availability to Youth Gun Violence, 59 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5 (1996) [hereinafter Blumstein & Cork, Linking Gun Availability]. The proliferation of handguns among youths exacerbated the recent increase in juvenile homicide rates. Blumstein attributes the changing patterns of age-specific homicide rates
among adolescents to the availability of guns in conjunction with the "crack" cocaine
drug industry that emerged in the mid-1980s. Blumstein, Youth Violence, supra at 10;
see also Blumstein & Cork, Linking Gun Availability, supra at 5. Blumstein hypothesizes
that the drug distribution industry attracts youths, especially urban, African-American
males who lack alternative economic opportunities, that youths in the drug industry
take more risks than would adults, and that they arm themselves for self-protection
and to resolve disputes. Blumstein, Youth Violence, supra at 30. Although guns constitute a "tool of the trade" in the drug industry, their diffusion into the broader youth
population for self-defense and status accounts for many of the "excess homicides"
among urban black males recorded in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Id.; see, e.g., 1
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE (Albert J. Reiss Jr. & Jeffrey Roth eds.,
1993).
Barry C. Feld, CriminalizingJuvenilejustice: Rules of Procedurefor the juvenile Court,
69 MINN. L. REv. 141, 161-63 (1984) [hereinafter Feld, Criminalizingjuvenilejustice].
Even prior to the late 1980s, a discernible trend was evident to transfer more youths
to criminal court and to base waiver decisions on the seriousness of the offense rather
than the characteristics of the offender, was evident. Barry C. Feld, TheJuvenile Court
Meets the Principleof Offense: Legislative Changes in juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 471, 472-73 (1987) [hereinafter Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statues]. There
was similar legislative trend to impose determinate or mandatory minimum sentences
in juvenile courts based on the seriousness of the offense rather than the "real needs"
of the offender. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. Ray. 821, 821-22 (1988) [hereinafter Feld, Punishment, Treatment]. Although the rate and scope of statutory changes
have accelerated dramatically within the past decade, these developments represent
continuations of the prior convergence of juvenile and criminal courts' sentencing
policies. Significantly, because of the substantial differences in violent offense arrest
rates by race, policies that increase sanctions for youth violence inevitably have a disproportionate impact on young black males.
3 Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and PublicPolicy: A Case Study ofJuvenile
justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965 (1995) [hereinafter Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy],
PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND
VIOLENTJUvENILE CRIME: RESEARCH REPORT 3-9 (1996); see also Barry C. Feld, Juvenile
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most states revised their waiver laws to restrictjudges' discretion
or to encourage them to transfer more youths to criminal court,
to expand prosecutors' authority to transfer youths, or legislatively to remove certain categories of offenses from the jurisdiction ofjuvenile courts.' These various legal trends have resulted
in the prosecution of more and younger youths in the criminal
justice system.
In 1995, Minnesota, like many other states, revised its juvenile waiver laws, focused judges' attention primarily on offensebased "public safety" criteria rather than a youth's "amenability
to treatment" when they make transfer decisions, and mandated
the criminal prosecution of older juveniles charged with first
degree murder. Unlike most other states which sought increased criminal prosecutions of youths, Minnesota also expanded the authority of juvenile court judges to impose longer
juvenile dispositions and to provide more extensive treatment
than previously available to ordinary delinquents. The Minnesota innovation, "Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile Prosecution
(EJJ)," allowed judges simultaneously to impose a delinquency
disposition and an adult criminal sentence, the execution of
which the judge stayed pending successful completion of the
delinquency sentence. 6 Several other jurisdictions now employ
some type of "blended sentencing" statute which authorizes a
judge to impose both ajuvenile and criminal sentence.
This article analyzes the implementation of Minnesota's
new E.] blended sentencing law in Hennepin County (Minneapolis), the largest metropolitan county in the state. First, we describe the legal framework for judicial waiver and E decisions
and briefly summarize prior research on waiver practices. Second, we analyze the cases of 504 youths against whom prosecuand CriminalJustice Systems' Responses to Youth Violence, 24 CmE & jus'cE 189, 189
(1998) [hereinafter Feld, Responses to Youth Vwilence].
4TORBETET Ai, supra note 3, at 59-61; Feld, Responses to Youth tiolence, supra
note 3,
at 205-12; see Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exdusion of Offenses from Juvenile CourtJurisdic.
tion: A Histoy and Critique, in TIM CHANGING BORDERS orJu%N. EJusnc.: TRANzsFEa
OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 83 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring
eds., 2000).
5 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 260.125, 260.121-260.126 (West 1998), nepealed by Laws 1999,
c. 139, art. 4, § 3; see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.125 (West Supp. 2001). See generally
Feld, Violent Youth and PublicPolicy, supra note 3.
6 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.126 (West 1998), repealed by Lais 1999, c. 139, art. 4, § 3;
see§ MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.130 (West Supp. 2001). See generally Feld, Irwlent Youth
andPublicPolicy, supranote 3.
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tors filed waiver and EJ motions between 1995 and 1997 to
identify the offender and offense variables that affect prosecutorial charging and judicial sentencing decisions. In our analyses,
we compare and contrast the characteristics of the EJJ and certification youths with those ofjuveniles in an earlier study against
whom Hennepin County prosecutors previously filed certification motions to transfer youths to criminal court.7 Comparing
current waiver and E]J practices with our previous certification
study baseline enables us to evaluate how the change in the law
affected prosecutorial and judicial policies. The current study
also examines the subsequent juvenile court processing, sentencing, and probation revocation experiences of those youths
whom prosecutors designated or upon whom judges conferred
the intermediate E3 status. Based on our evaluations of the
implementation of the EjJ law, we consider the "net-widening"
and policy implications of this blended juvenile and criminal
court sentencing option.
II.

JUDICIAL WAIVER AND EXTENDEDJURISDIGCONJUVENILE

PROSECUTION

From the juvenile court's inception, judges could deny
some young offenders its protective jurisdiction and transfer
them to adult court.8 Nationally and in Minnesota, the recent
escalation in youth violence provoked extensive legislative
amendments to transfer more chronological juveniles to criminal courts. States employ several different statutory alternatives
to transfer youths: judicial waiver, legislative exclusion of specific offenses, and prosecutorial choice of forum between concurrentjurisdictions.
Judicial waiver is the most common transfer mechanism and
reflects juvenile courts' traditional approach to deciding
whether the state should treat a youth as a juvenile or punish
him as an adult. Until recent amendments, a juvenile court
judge typically waived juvenile court jurisdiction after a hearing
7 Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy and Practice:
Persistence,Seriousness, and Race, 14 LAW & INEQ.J. 73 (1995) [hereinafter Podkopacz &
Feld, JudicialWaiver]; see Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The End of the
Line: An Empirical Study of Judicial Waiver, 86J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOG'Y 449 (1996)
[hereinafter Podkopacz & Feld, End of the Line].
' DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 205-37 (1980).
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to determine whether a youth was "amenable to treatment" or
posed a threat to public safety. Judges' case-by-case assessment
of a youth's rehabilitative potential and dangerousness reflected
the individualized sentencing discretion characteristic of juvenile courts.
Two United States Supreme Court cases provide the constitutional framework for making these individualized judicial
waiver decisions. In Kent v. United States,9 the Court held that
states must provide juveniles with some procedural due process
protections in waiver hearings and thereby formalized this special sentencing decision. In Breed v. Jones,'0 the Court applied
the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy provisions to the adjudication of delinquents and required states to decide whether to
try a youth in juvenile or criminal court before proceeding on
the merits of the charge.
Although Kent and Breed provide the procedural framework
forjudicial waiver decisions, the substantive bases for these decisions pose much greater difficulties. Until recent reforms, most
jurisdictions allowed juvenile court judges to waive jurisdiction
based on an individualized assessment of a youth's
"dangerousness" or "amenability to treatment." In practice,
judges assess "amenability" and "dangerousness" by focusing on
three sets of variables: the offender's age and the amount of
time left to treat the youth within juvenile jurisdiction; the
youth's treatment prognoses as reflected in clinical evaluations;
and thejuvenile's threat to others as reflected in the seriousness
of the present offense and prior record. Juvenile court judges
waive older youths more readily than younger offenders." A
youth's age in relation to the juvenile court's maximum dispositional jurisdiction limits the court's dispositional authority and
provides the impetus to waive or exclude some older juveniles if
the seriousness of the offense deserves a longer sentence than
those available in juvenile court. 2 The second set of "amenabil'Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
"Breed v.Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
"

U.S.

GEN. ACCOUNTING OFICE, JUVENIE JUSTICE

JUVENIS PROCESSE

IN

CRIMINAL COURT AND CASE DISPOSrMONS (1995); Jeffrey Fagan & Elizabeth Piper
Deschenes, Delerminates of Judicidal Waiver Decisionsfor Violent Juvenile Offendem, 81 J.
CRIM. L. & CnMNOLOGy 314, 336-42 (1990); Podkopacz & Feld,JudiciaiWaiver, supr
note 7, at 121-23; Podkopacz & Feld, End of te Line, supra note 7, at 479-80.
2For example, judges in states where juvenile court dispositions can continue
until age twenty-one waive youths at about half the rate as judges in states where juvenile
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ity" factors include the youth's treatment prognosis based on
clinical evaluations and prior correctional experiences. Once a
youth exhausts the available juvenile correctional resources,
transfer becomes increasingly more likely.13 Finally, judges assess a youth's "dangerousness" and threat to others based on his
or her present offense and prior record. Factors such as the seriousness of the offense, whether the youth used a weapon, and
the length of the prior record provide indicators of
"dangerousness." Balancing these factors entails a trade-off between offense seriousness and offender persistence.
Asking a judge to decide a youth's "amenability to treatment" or "dangerousness" implicates many of the most fundamental issues ofjuvenilejurisprudence. 5 Such laws assume that
effective treatment programs exist for at least some serious or
chronic young offenders and presuppose that classification systems exist with which to differentiate among youths' treatment
potentials or dangerousness. These laws also presume that clinicians or judges possess valid and reliable diagnostic tools with
which to determine the appropriate disposition for a particular
youth. Evaluation research challenges these legislative assumptions and questions whether programs exist to systematically reduce the risks of recidivism among chronic or violent young
offenders and whether judges or clinicians possess the instruments with which to identify which youths will or will not respond to treatment.16 Statutes that authorize judges to waive a
court jurisdiction ends at ages eighteen or nineteen. HOWARD N. SNYDER &JOHN L.
HUTZLER, NAT'L CENTER FORJUvENILEJUSICE, THE SERIOUSJUVILE OFFENDER: THE
SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE OFJUVENILE COURTS (1981); THOMAS S.
VEREB & JOHN L. HUTZLER, NAT'L CENTER FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JuVENE
AS

CRImiNALs: 1981

STATUTEsANALYSIS

(1981).

'sSee generally Podkopacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra note 7; Podkopacz & Feld,
JudicialWaiver, supra note 7.
"4See Fagan & Deschenes, supra note 11; see alsoJames C. Howell, Juvenile Transfers
to the CriminalJustice System: State of the Art, 18 LAw & POL'Y 17 (1996); Podkopacz &
Feld,JudicialWaiver, supra note 7, at 121-31; Podkopacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra
note 7, at 467-71.
" Barry C. Feld, Reference ofJuvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REv. 515 (1978) [hereinafter
Feld, UnanswerableQuestions].
16See id.; Barry C. Feld, Delinquent Careers and Criminal Policy: Just Deserts and the
Waiver Decision, 21 CRIMfNOLOGY 195 (1983) [hereinafter Feld, Delinquent Careers);
Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 2; Lee B. Sechrest, Classificationfor Treatment, 9
CRImE &JusTicE 293 (1987); Steven P. Lab &John T. Whitehead, An Analysis ofJuvenile CorrectionalTreatment, 34 CRIME & Da.rNQ. 60 (1988) [hereinafter Lab & White-
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youth who poses a threat to the public require judges to predict
"dangerousness" even though clinicians and judges lack the
technical
capacity reliably to predict serious future criminal be17
havior.
Judicial waiver criteria framed in terms of "amenability to
treatment" or "dangerousness" give judges broad, standard-less
discretion. Lists of substantive factors such as those appended
in Kent do not provide adequate guidance.' 8 Rather, catalogues
of contradictory factors reinforce judges' discretion and allow
them selectively to emphasize one element or another to justify
any decision. The subjective nature of waiver decisions, the absence of effective guidelines to structure outcomes, and the lack
of objective indicators or scientific tools with which to classify
youths allows judges to make unequal and disparate rulings
without any effective procedural or appellate checks. Empirical
analyses provide compelling evidence that judges apply waiver
statutes in an arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory manner.'9
States' waiver rates for similar types of offenders vary extensively ° A youth's race also may affect waiver decisions. 2' Even

headJuvenile CorrectionalTreatment]; Steven P. Lab &John T. Whitehead, From Nothing Works" to "The Appropriate Works": The Latest Stop on the Searchfor the Secular Grail,28
CRmIIOLoGY405 (1990) [hereinafter Lab &Whitehead, The Latest Stop].
' See a/soJeffrey Fagan & Martin Guggenheim, Preventive Detention and theJudicial
Prediction of Dangerousness for Juveniles: A Natural Experimen4 86 J. CRIM. L &
CRIMINOLOGY 415 (1996).
See generally JOHN MONOHAN, PREDIcnNG VIOLEN
BEH.miWO AN AsSEsNT OF CLINCAL TECHIQms (Sage Libr. of Soc. Res., Vol. 114,
1981); Norval & Marc Miller, PredictionsofDangerousness,6 CRIm &JusTICE 1 (1985).
'8 TWENnIIEH CENTuRY FuND TASK FORCE ON SEN-ENCING PoucY TOWARD YOUNG
OFFENDERS, CONFRONTiNcGYoUTH CRIm (1978); Franklin E. Zimring, Notes Toward a
Jurisprudenceof Waiver, in READINGS IN PUBuC POUICY (John C. Hall et al. eds., 1981).
" DONNA HAPARIAN ET Ai-, U.S. DEP'T OFJusTncE AND DE.ImQUENCY PREVENTION,
YousH IN ADULT CouRis: BETWEEN Two WORLDs (1982); Fagan & Deschenes, supra
note 11; Barry C. Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases: Reflections on Teen-Aged AxeMurderers,JudicialActivism, and LegislativeDefault, 8 LAw & INEQ.J. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Feld, Teen-Aged Axe-Murderers).
2 HAaiARi.N E- AL, supranote 19; U.S. GEN. ACcOUNmiNG OFcE,supra note 11.
21
Joel Eigen, The Determinants and Impact ofJurisdictionalTransfer in Philadelphia,in
READINGS IN PUBLIC Poucy (John Hall et al. eds., 1981) (hereinafter Eigen, Jurisdictional Transfer];Joel Eigen, Punishing Youth Homicide Offenders in Philadelphia, 72
J. CRIm. L & CRIMNOLOGY 1072 (1981) [hereinafter Eigen, Youth Homicide Offenders];
HANIPARLAN ET AL, supranote 19; Jeffrey Fagan et al., Racial Determinantsof theJudicial
Transfer Decision: ProsecutingViolent Youth in Criminal Court, 33 CRLM & DE.INQ. 259
(1987). In analyses in four states in which the U.S. General Accounting Office could
control for the effects of race on Judicial Waiver decisions, it found that judges trans-
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within a single jurisdiction, judges do not administer or apply
waiver statutes consistently from county to county or court to
court.22 Research in several states reports a contextual pattern
of 'justice by geography" in which where youths lived, rather
than what they did, determined their juvenile or adult status.23
Even within a single urban county, judges in the same court decide cases of similarly-situated offenders differently.24 These differences influence both the characteristics of youths waived and
the sentences they received as adults. Differences in judicial
philosophies, the location of a waiver hearing, a youth's race, or
organizational politics may explain as much about transfer decisions as do a youth's offense or personal characteristics.
A. WAIVER IN MINNESOTA

Prior to the 1995 legislative revisions, Minnesota employed
a typical judicial waiver law that authorized a judge to transfer
jurisdiction if the court found that "the child is not suitable to
treatment or that the public safety is not served under the provisions of laws relating to juvenile courts."5 In practice, implementation of this broad mandate suffered from two interrelated
problems: the highly discretionary, idiosyncratic nature of individualized sentencing decisions and the disjunction between the
criteria for transfers from juvenile court and those for sentences
in adult criminal courts. Juvenile court judges attempted to assess a youth's "amenability to treatment" or "dangerousness"
without valid clinical indicators to identify which serious young
offenders might respond to intervention. They often transferred juveniles upon whom criminal court judges subsequently
ferred black youths charged with violent, property, or drug offenses more readily
than comparable white offenders. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTNG OFFCE, supra note 11.
2 HAMPARIAN ET AL., supra note 19; Feld,Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 2; Feld,
Teen-Aged Axe-Murderers, supranote 19.
2 JAMES PAUL HEUSER, OREGON DEP'T OFJUSTICE CRIME ANALYSIS CENTER, JUVENILES
ARRESTED FOR SERIOUS FELONY CRIMES IN OREGON AND "REMANDED" TO ADULT CRIMINAL
COURTS: A STATISTICAL STUDY (1985); HAPARAN ET AL, supra note 19; Feld, Teen-Aged

Axe-Murderers, supra note 19; Feld, Violent Youth & PublicPolicy, supra note 3. In some
states, for example, rural judges waive jurisdiction over youths more readily than urban judges. HAMPARIAN ET AL., supranote 19; Feld, Teen-Aged Axe-Murderers, supra note
19; Tammy Meredith Poulos & Stan Orchowsky, SeriousJuvenile Offenders: Predictingthe
Probabilityof Transferto CriminalCourt, 40 CRIME & DEINQ. 3 (1994).
24 Podkopacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra note 7; Podkopacz & Feld,
Judicial
Waiver, supranote 7.
2MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.125(2) (d) (West 1992).
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imposed shorter sentences as adults than they could have received as delinquents.
In 1992, the Minnesota Legislature, Governor, and Supreme Court jointly appointed a Juvenile Justice Task Force to
examine and propose revisions of the statutes governing certification ofjuveniles to criminal courts, and procedural safeguards
and sentencing options available in juvenile courts.'" The Juvenile Justice Task Force recommended (and the legislature enacted) the 1995 law to provide a stronger and more consistent
response to serious and violentjuvenile offenders, to give judges
clearer guidelines within an individualized sentencing process,
and to improve the congruence between judicial waiver decisions and criminal court sentencing practices.Y The new law
simplified certification procedures, used the "presumptive
commitment" offenses in the adult Sentencing Guidelines to
define serious juvenile offenders whom juvenile court judges
presumptively should waive, and created an intermediate category of young offenders who could receive extended sentences
in juvenile court. The Sentencing Guidelines, which apply to
adult criminal defendants, presume that judges should commit
to prison offenders convicted of certain violent crimes.3 The
new certification law used the Sentencing Guidelines' presumptive offense framework to structure juvenile court waiver and
sentencing decisions. The law used the Guidelines' presumptive offense criteria to make certification easier and more consistent, integrated juvenile court waiver and criminal court
sentencing practices, emphasized "public safety" over treatment
considerations, and enhanced the sentencing authority of juvenile courts.
The new law provides that a prosecutor may file a motion to
transfer only against juveniles charged with felony-level offenses 9 The new statute still retains a revised version of the juFeld, Violent Youth andPublicPoliLy, supranote 3, at 997.
27

Id. at 1024.

I8
MINN.
SENTENCiNG Gtrmaum-s § V offense severity reference table (1999). The
table includes in severity level VII-X offenses such as: second and third degree murder, first degree assault, first degree criminal sexual conduct, and aggravated robbery.
2'The new statute provides that "[w]hen a child is alleged to have committed, after
becoming 14 years of age, an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult,
the juvenile court may enter an order certifying the proceeding for action under the
laws and court procedures controlling adult criminal violations." MINN. STAT. ANN. §
260B.125 (1) (West Supp. 2001).
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dicial waiver process. For juveniles aged fourteen to seventeen
and charged with any felony offense, the prosecutor must prove
by "clear and convincing evidence" that protection of "public
safety" requires the juvenile's transfer to criminal court. For
youths aged sixteen or seventeen whom prosecutors charge with
a Sentencing Guidelines' presumptive commitment to prison,
the new waiver law presumes that the juvenile court judge
should transfer the youth to criminal court.3 While a prosecutor bears the burden of proof in an "ordinary" certification proceeding, the statutory presumption shifts the burden to older
juveniles charged with serious offenses to show by "clear and
convincing" evidence that retaining their case in juvenile court
serves "public safety." Under the new law, older juveniles
charged with a serious offense bear the risk of non-persuasion,
and if they fail to meet that burden, waiver is nonsoMINN.

STAT. ANN. § 260B.125(2) provides that:

[T] hejuvenile court may order a certification [to district court] only if:...
(2) a motion for certification has been filed by the prosecuting authority; ....
(5) the court finds that there is probable cause ... ;and
(6) the court finds either:.
(i) that the presumption of certification created by subdivision 3 applies and the
child has not rebutted the presumption by clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that retaining the proceeding in the juvenile court serves public safety; or
(ii) that the presumption of certification does not apply and the prosecuting
authority has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that retaining the proceeding in the juvenile court does not serve public safety. If the court finds that the
prosecutor has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that retaining the
proceeding in juvenile court does not serve public safety, the court shall retain the proceeding in juvenile court.
" The statute states:
It is presumed that a proceeding involving an offense committed by a child will be certified
(to district court] if:
(1) the child was 16 or 17 years old at the time of the offense; and
(2) the delinquency petition alleges that the child committed an offense that would result
in a presumptive commitment to prison under the sentencing guidelines and applicable
statutes, or that the child committed any felony offense while using, whether by brandishing, displaying, threatening with, or otherwise employing a firearm.
If the court determines that probable cause exists to believe the child committed the alleged offense, the burden is on the child to rebut this presumption by demonstrating by
clear and convincing evidence that retaining the proceeding in the juvenile court serves
public safety. If the court finds that the child has not rebutted the presumption by clear
and convincing evidence, the court shall certify the proceeding.
MMN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.125(3).
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discretionary.
The legislature expected that creating a presumption for waiver based on an allegation of a serious crime
and shifting the burden of persuasion to the youth would increase the number of youths certified to criminal court.
To further expedite transfer to criminal court, the new law
amended the waiver criteria from "amenability to treatment" to
give primacy to "public safety." The emphasis on "public safety"
reflects the political reality that control of serious youth crime,
rather than a child's responsiveness to treatment, is the real reason for waiver. The legislative definition of the "public safety"
criteria further strengthens the connection between serious juvenile offenses and the adult Sentencing Guidelines' framework:
In determining whether the public safety is served by certifying the matter, the court shall consider the following factors:
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of community protection, including the existence of any aggravating factors recognized by
the sentencing guidelines, the use of a firearm, and the impact on any
victim;
(2) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged offense, including the level of the child's participation in planning and carrying out the
offense and the existence of any mitigating factors recognized by the
sentencing guidelines;
(3) the child's prior record of delinquency;,
(4) the child's programming history, including the child's past willingness to participate meaningfully in available programming;
(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming available in the juvenile justice system; and
(6) the dispositional options available for the child.
In considering these factors, the court shall give greater weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense and the child's prior record of delinquency than to the other factors listed in this subdivision.

s2Feld, Violent Youth and PublicPolicy, supra note 3, at 1027-28.
s MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.125(4). See generally Feld, Trolent Youth and PublicPolicy,
supranote 3, at 1031-33 (analyzing policy rationale for "public safety" criteria).
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Under the "public safety" criteria, ajuvenile court judge effectively must decide whether a youth's offense severity, criminal history, and "unamenability to probation" warrant adult
imprisonment.
The new law still requires ajuvenile court judge to conduct
a waiver hearing whether the prosecutor charges a youth with a
presumptive-certification offense or seeks certification on "public safety" grounds. - A prosecutor initiates a certification proceeding by filing a motion. Because the charges filed determine
whether the presumption for certification applies and thus
which party bears the burden of proof, the court must make a
threshold determination of probable cause.36

Legislatively linking presumptive certification with the Sentencing Guidelines
also implicates many court decisions interpreting the Guidelines' policy and jurisprudence. For example, adult defendants may rebut the Sentencing Guidelines' presumption of commitment to prison by showing that they are "amenable to
probation." See generally Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Reform in Minnesota, Ten Years After: Reflections on Dale G. Parent'sStructuringCriminal Sentences: The Evolution of Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines, 75 MiNN. L. REV. 727, 740 (1991) (discussing the operation
of Minnesota's sentencing guidelines). In State v. Wright, 310 N.W.2d 461, 461 (Minn.
1981), the defendant faced a presumptive prison term of twenty-four months, but the
trial court stayed the term, made a mitigated dispositional departure, and ordered
probation with six months in a workhouse jail then release to a treatment program.
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the departure because the defendant was
"particularly unamenable to incarceration" and he was "particularly amenable to individualized treatment in a probation-setting." Id. at 462-63. The court found that
because of his immaturity, Wright would be easily victimized in prison or misled into
criminal activity by other inmates. The court also found that he needed psychiatric
treatment that would not be available in an institutional setting and that he would not
endanger public safety if he received appropriate treatment on an out-patient basis.
Id. at 462. Subsequently, in State v. Trogg 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982), the court
upheld a mitigated downward departure based solely on a finding that the defendant
was "amenable to probation." Thus, to the extent that the Sentencing Guidelines' rebuttable presumption jurisprudence shapes interpretation of the analogous presumptive-certification provisions, trial judges in certification hearings must still determine
whether a youth is amenable to an EJJ probationary disposition.
MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 260B.125(2).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.125(2),(4); see also MINN. R. GRiM. P. 11.03 (1983) ("A
finding by the court of probable cause shall be based upon the entire record including reliable hearsay in whole or in part."); MINN. R. Juv. P. 18.04(3) (B) (probable

cause determination made pursuant to MNN. R. OF CRIM. P. 11).
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B. EXTENDED JURISDICTION JUVENILE PROSECUTIONS-BLENDED
SENTENCING

One fundamental limitation of any waiver law is its binary
quality-either treatment as a juvenile or punishment as an
adult-even though adolescents and criminal careers develop
along a continuum and require an array of graduated controls.
In addition to changing the waiver provisions, the 1995 law created a new, intermediate category-Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile Prosecutions (EJ)-in which juvenle courts could try some
serious young offenders in juvenile court, provide them with all
adult criminal procedural safeguards (including the right to a
jury trial), and then impose both ajuvenile court sentence and a
stayed adult criminal sentence. 7 Several other jurisdictions also
provide "blended" juvenile-criminal sentences for intermediate
categories of serious young offenders as an alternative to
waiverss
" MN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.130 (West Supp. 2001); Feld, Viwlent Youth and Public
Policy, supra note 3, at 1038-51.

New Mexico recently created a "youthful offender" status for juveniles charged
with serious crimes, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-3(I) (1999). Juveniles in New Mexico

enjoy the right to ajury trial. Id. at § 32A-2-16. The statute authorizes either an adult
criminal sentence, or a juvenile disposition with extended jurisdiction until age 21
with a waiver hearing to decide whether to sentence the juvenile as an adult or youthful offender. Id. at § 32A-2-20.
In Texas, for example, juveniles may be indicted for certain serious crimes, tried

in juvenile court with all adult criminal procedural safeguards, including the right to
ajury trial, and sentenced to up to forty years of confinement with their term beginning injuvenile facilities and, if not released from the Youth Commission, continuing
in an adult correctional facility. TEx. FA . CODE ANN. §§ 53.045, 54.04, 54.11 (West
1996 & Supp. 1999). The Texas determinate sentencing law subjects children 10 to
16 years of age to sentences of up to 40 years in prison if they are indicted for one of
six designated felonies. Id at § 54.04(d) (3). Juveniles receive the same procedural
guarantees as do adult criminal defendants. Id. at § 53.045(a). Juveniles begin their
sentences in juvenile facilities, and at age 18 a court conducts a hearing to decide if
they will be retained within the juvenile correctional system for the duration of their
minority (until age 21), or complete their determinate sentence in the Texas Department of Corrections. Id. at §§ 54.04(d)(3), 54.11. Challenges to the law have
been unsuccessful. The Texas legislation greatly increases the sanctioning power of
juvenile courts to respond to youths below 15 years old, the minimum age to transfer
juveniles to criminal courts, and provides prosecutors with a powerful alternative to
adult prosecution. See Robert 0. Dawson, The Third Justice System: The NewJuvenileCriminal System of Determinate Sentencingfor the Youthful Vrolent Offender in Texas, 19 ST.

MAmYS L.J. 943, 946 (1989) (explaining that the primary focus of the determinate
sentencing system is on violent offenses committed by 13 and 14 year-olds as well as
on providing prosecutors with alternatives to discretionary transfer for older violent
juveniles); Robert O. Dawson, The Violent Juvenile Offender: An EmpiricalStudy ofJuvenile
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Currently, most waived juveniles are sixteen or seventeen
years old. 9 Prior to the 1995 amendments, juvenile courts' dispositional authority over delinquents ended when a youth
reached age nineteen. 0 The termination of dispositional jurisdiction at the age of nineteen restricted juvenile courts' authority to impose appropriate sanctions on older youths and
encouraged judges to certify some older juveniles who did not
necessarily require extended adult incarceration. A juvenile's
time remaining within the jurisdiction of juvenile courts often
provides the impetus for judges to waive older youths to criminal court.4' Thus, increasing juvenile courts' dispositional jurisdiction could reduce the pressure to certify some youths.
The 1995 law created an intermediate Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile (EMJ) status." When a prosecutor files a delinquency petition alleging a felony offense, a motion must
accompany the petition indicating whether the prosecutor also
seeks an EJ designation or adult certification. As Table 1 in-

DeterminateSentencing Proceedingsas an Alternative to CriminalProsecution, 21 TEX. TECH.
L. REv. 1897, 1921-24 (1990) (examining the age distribution of the juveniles handled under the Texas determinate sentencing statute); see also Connie Hickman Tanner, Arkansas' ExtendedJuvenileJurisdictionAct: The Balance of Offender Rehabilitation and
Accountability, 22 U. AR. LrrrLE ROcK L. REV. 647 (2000) (analyzing Arkansas' Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction law); Randi-Lynn Smalheer, Sentence Blending and the
Promise of Rehabilitation:BringingtheJuvenileJustice System Full Circle, 28 HOFsmA L. REV.
259 (1999) (analyzing alternative forms of blended sentencing in juvenile and criminal court); Mary E. Spring, ExtendedJurisdictionJuvenile Prosecution:A New Approach to
the Problem ofJuvenile Delinquency in Illinois,J. M. L. REv. 31, 1351 (1998) (analyzing Illinois Extended JurisdictionJuvenile Prosecution statute).
3' HowARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VIcTIMs: A
NAT'L REPORT (1995); Podkopacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra note 7; Podkopacz &
Feld,JudicialWaiver, supranote 7.
40 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.181 (West 1992). The 1982 amendment of § 260.181
shortened the period ofjuvenile courtjurisdiction from age 21 to age 19. 1982 MINN.
LAWS 615, § 4.
" See, e.g., Fagan & Deschenes, supra note 11, at 341 (youth's age at the time of offense was the most consistent factor in waiver decisions, with older youths transferred
more often); Podkopacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra note 7; Podkopacz & Feld, Judicial Waiver, supranote 7.
" SeeMNN. STAT. ANN. § 260.126(1) (West 1992), repealed by Laws 1999, c. 139, art.
4, § 3; see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.130(1) (West Supp. 2001).
13 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.141(4) (West Supp. 2001); see also §§
260B.141,
260C.141.
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dicates, the new statute provides several methods to subject a
youth to an EJ prosecution."
One gateway to EMJ is an unsuccessful attempt to certify a
youth. In an ordinary certification hearing involving a youth
fourteen to seventeen years of age and charged with any felony
(Option 3, Table 1), if the judge does not certify the youth for
criminal prosecution, then she may designate the subsequent
juvenile court proceeding as either an EM prosecution or an ordinary delinquency hearing.* A second gateway concerns a presumptive-certification proceeding (Option 4, Table 1) which
involves a sixteen or seventeen year-old youth charged with an
offense for which the Sentencing Guidelines presume commitment to prison. In these proceedings, if the judge does not certify the youth, then she must designate the subsequent juvenile
proceeding as an EMJ prosecution. 4 ' Because the law assumes
that judges will certify the "worst of the worst" to criminal court,
the mandatoy EM dispositions for older, presumptive commitment offenders subjects the "less bad of the worst" to more
stringent controls than those available in ordinary delinquency
proceedings. Effectively, ajudge's decision not to certify a presumptive-certification sixteen or seventeen year-old youth entails a determination that the youth is "amenable to probation"
under the juvenile court's strengthened E J provisions.
A third gateway to EM status arises when a prosecutor
charges a youth sixteen or seventeen years of age with a presumptive-certification offense and designates the case as an EMJ
prosecution automatically without any further judicial review
(Option 2, Table 1).' 7 Because the only alternative to waiver
available to a judge following a presumptive-certification hearing is to designate the case as an EM prosecution (Option 4, Table 1),4 the law allows the prosecutor efficiently to designate the
case as an EM proceeding. Thus, prosecutors need not file pro
forma certification motions when they do not really desire adult
" See id. § 260B.130(1).
Id. § 260B.130(1)(1). The rules of procedure for the juvenile court provide that
"[i]f the court does not order certification in a case in which certification is not presumed, the court may consider designating the proceeding an extended jurisdiction

juvenile prosecution." To do so, the prosecution must prove that "public safety" requires such designation. MiNN.R.Juv. P. § 18.05(5) (B) (West 2001).
M'
MINN.STAT. ANN. § 260B.130(1) (2); MINN. R.Juv. P. § 18.05(5) (A) (West 2001).
SeeMINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.130(1) (2) (providing for this procedure).
'sSee id. §260B.125(5).
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TABLE 1.
MINNESOTA'S ADULT CERTIFICATION AND BLENDED SENTENCING PROCESS
(Extended JuvenileJurisdiction-EJJ)
PROSECUTOR PETITIONED
EXTENDED JUVENFLE
JURISDICTION (EM) MOTION

PROSECUTOR PETITIONED
ADULT CERTIFICATION MOTION

Option I

Option 2

Option 3

Option 4

Option 5

EJJ Motion
(NonPresumptive)

EM Designate
(Presumptive)

NonPresumptive
Certification

Presumptive
Certification

Mandatory
Certification

a. 16-17 years
old
and
b. Presumptive offense

a. 14-17 years old
and
b. Prior successful
certification AND a
new felony charge
or
c. First degree murder charge

a. 16-17 years
old
and
b. Presumptive
offense

a. 14-17 years
old
and
b. Any felony

a. 14-17 years
old
and
b. Any felony

PossiBLE RESULTS OF THESE MOTIONS
El Motion

Juvenile Court

Adult Certification Motion

EM-Blended

Juveni eCourt

Adult ourt
EIJ-Ble;rded

POSSIBLE DISPOSMONS IF CONVICTED
Juvenile Court Dispositions-all traditional correctional/treatment options, including probation, restitution, worksquad, fines.
El-Blended Sentencing Dispositions-adult prison sentence stayed on condition that
juvenile disposition is completed successfully. E probation is intensive supervision including multiple weekly contact.
Adult Court Dispositions-all traditional correctional/treatment options, including
probation, restitution, community service, fines.
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criminal status and they obtain greater plea bargaining leverage
in the most serious juvenile cases.
Finally, the legislation provides a fourth gateway to EM] prosecution for other serious and younger offenders. Instead of filing a certification motion against a non-presumptivecertification youth, a prosecutor may file a motion for the court
to designate the youth for EM prosecution (Option 1, Table 1).'9
Just as a judge may deny a motion to certify and designate a
fourteen to seventeen-year-old charged with any felony as an EM
when "public safety" requires, similarly a judicial hearing on a
prosecutor's motion for an E designation provides for the
same result.50 At the EM[ hearing, the prosecution must prove by
"clear and convincing evidence" that "public safety" warrants
designating the proceeding as an EMJ prosecution, using the
same "public safety" criteria specified in the certification legislation.51 Table 1 summarizes the alternative pathways to an EMJ
status and the various dispositions available to a judge pursuant
to each pathway. Significantly, the alternative criteria for certification and for EM status are identical-sixteen or seventeen
years of age (Table 1, Options 2 and 4), and charged with a presumptive commitment to prison offense and fourteen to seventeen years of age and charged with any felony (Table 1, Options
1 and 3).
Regardless of the mechanism by which a county attorney
commences an EMJ prosecution, an EM youth receives greater
procedural protections than those available in ordinary juvenile
delinquency prosecutions, including the right to a jury trial."
The right to a trial by jury is an essential component of this new
quasi-adult status, because a court imposes both a juvenile disposition and a criminal sentence which the court stays pending

49

MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 260B.130(1) (3).
5oSee MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.130(2) (requiring prosecutor to show by clear and
convincing evidence that an El] prosecution serves public safety); MINN. R. Jv. P. §
19.01(3) (West 2001).
-"MiNN.STAT. ANN. § 260B.130(2); seae xNN. R.Juv. P. § 19.05 (West 2001) (setting
forth factors to be considered in determining whether an EM] prosecution serves public safety).
52
- MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.130(3) (child prosecuted as an EM has the right to jury
trial and effective assistance of counsel); Id. § 260B.155(1) (a) (child prosecuted as an
EM] has the right to jury trial on the issue of guilt).
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compliance with the conditions of juvenile probation.53 The
legislation also includes all EJJ convictions in a youth's Sentencing Guidelines criminal history score in the same manner as for
adult offenses. It requires juvenile courts to retain EJJ records
for as long as they would retain those of adult offenders.s Using juvenile convictions to enhance subsequent adult criminal
sentences arguably requires providing to juveniles all adult
criminal procedural safeguards.56
The new law also includes some provisions to restrict prosecutorial over-charging of juveniles as presumptive-certification
E. s57 The EM statute distinguishes between findings of guilt on
" See id. § 260B.130(4) (allowing court to impose both ajuvenile and an adult sentence); MINN. R. Juv. P. § 19.08 (West 2001). Adult criminal procedural safeguards
constitute a constitutional prerequisite to imposing a valid adult sentence. Feld, Violent Youth and PublicPolicy, supra note 3.
" See MIm. STAT. ANN. § 260B.245 (West Supp. 2001). This, in turn, requires
amendment of the juvenile court record keeping and reporting provisions, and of the
Sentencing Guidelines. 1994 MINN. LAWS 576, § 60 ('The sentencing guidelines
commission shall modify the guidelines to take effectJanuary 1, 1995, to provide that
an extended jurisdiction juvenile conviction is treated under the guidelines in the
same manner as a felony conviction of an adult.")
I MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.171 (1) (West Supp. 2001).
"6See generally Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 3, at 1063-65; David
Dormont, For the Good of the Adult: An Examination of the Constitutionalityof UsingPrior
Juvenile Adjudications to EnhanceAdult Sentences, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1769, 1793-94 (1991)
("[C]ourts should not interpret McKeiver to justify using juvenile convictions with reduced procedural protections for punitive purposes at the adult level. Interpreted in
this manner, McKeiver would not allow courts to enhance an adult's sentence based
on juvenile sentences obtained during proceedings governed by the lower 'fundamental fairness' standard.").
" See Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 3, at 1042-43 (discussing that
Juvenile Justice Task Force members were concerned that allowing prosecutors to
designate "presumptive certification" juveniles as EJJs without filing a certification
motion or judicial review could lead to abuse through prosecutorial overcharging);
Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Transfer ofJuveniles to Criminal Court: A Case
Study and Analysi of ProsecutorialWaiver, 5 NoTRE DAmEJ.L. ETmcS & PuB. POL'Y 281
(1991). Although the Task Force endorsed prosecutorial designation of presumptivecertification juveniles as E[Js, members feared that:
allowing prosecutors to designate EJJs without judicial review could result in adult confinement of inappropriate youths if courts revoked their EJJ probation status. They concluded, however, that restricting EJJ eligibility to older, presumptive-certification juveniles,
requiring prosecutors to use adult criminal procedures to try EM cases, and removing the
EJJ designation from youths convicted of lesser, non-presumptive offenses, would foster
realism in charging and provide adequate checks on prosecutorial designation of EX
cases.
Feld, Violent Youth and PublicPolicy, supranote 3, at 1043.
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a lesser-included, non-presumptive-commitment offense after
trial and after a guilty plea.58 If, after a trial, the judge or jury
convicts the youth of a lesser-included, non-presumptivecommitment offense, then the juvenile court may only sentence
the youth as an ordinary delinquent because the trial verdict establishes that the prosecutor incorrectly assessed the seriousness
of the offense when she originally designated the juvenile as an
EM. However, to expedite plea bargaining, a youth may enter a
guilty plea to a non-presumptive-commitment offense and still
receive an EJJ disposition. ' Finally, the law raised juvenile
courts' dispositional jurisdiction from age nineteen for ordinary
delinquents to age twenty-one for EJ youths.60
The legislature "regarded an EJ prosecution as 'one last
chance at success in the juvenile system' and discussed how to
prevent 'one last chance' from becoming two, or three, or four
more chances."5 ' While some legislators wanted any juvenile
probation violation or new offense to result in automatic execution of the stayed adult sentence, others feared that mandatory
revocation for technical violations or trivial offenses would be
excessively rigid and could remit many inappropriate youths to
prison. Ultimately, the law instructed judges to treat EJ probation violations in the same manner as they would treat subsequent offenses or probation violations by adult probationers. If
an EJ youth allegedly violated the conditions of the stayed sentence or committed a new offense:
the court may, without notice, revoke the stay and probation and direct
that the offender be taken into immediate custody. The court shall noSeeMiNN. SATANN. § 260B.130(4)(b) (West Supp. 2001):

If a child prosecuted as an extended jurisdiction juvenile after designation by the prosecutor in the delinquency petition is convicted of an offense after trial that is not an offense
described in subdivision 1, clause (2) [presumptive commitment], the court shall adjudi-

cate

the child delinquent and order a disposition under Section 260B.198. If the ex-

tended jurisdiction juvenile proceeding results in a guilty plea for an offense not
described in subdivision 1, clause (2), the court may impose a[n EIJI disposition under
paragraph (a) if the child consents.
59 Id.
This provision allows juveniles to plea-bargain for non-presumptivecommitment adult offenses to avoid incarceration and to protect their criminal history scores. It also allows prosecutors to avoid judicial hearings at which they would
have to prove that public safety requires an EJJ designation for a youth charged with a
non-presumptive-commitment felony. See id. § 260B.130(3).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.193(5) (West Supp. 2001).
r, Feld, izolent Youth and PublicPolicy, supra note 3, at 1047-49.
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tify the offender in writing of the reasons alleged to exist for revocation
of the stay of execution of the adult sentence. If the offender challenges
the reasons, the court shall hold a summary hearing on the issue 6at
2
which the offender is entitled to be heard and represented by counsel.

The provisions for written notice, appointment of counsel,
and a summary hearing correspond to adult probation revocation procedures.0 Significantly, even if a court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that an offender violated the conditions of probation or committed a new offense, it need not execute a previously stayed criminal sentence and may continue the
stay or place other conditions of probation on the offender. 4
To avoid stretching "one last chance" into several chances and
thereby diminishing the significance of an E designation,
however, the legislature strengthened probation revocation
procedures for presumptive certification or prosecutordesignated EJs. If an E youth convicted of a presumptivecommitment-to-prison offense commits a new offense or violates
the conditions of the stayed sentence, "the court must order
execution of the previously imposed sentence unless the court
makes written findings retgfding the mitigating factors thatjustify continuing the stay." For these youths, the court must execute the stayed sentence unless it finds mitigating circumstances
such as would justify a downward departure under the Sentencing Guidelines. Because the Sentencing Guidelines require
courts to provide "substantial and compelling" reasons to justify
downward departures from presumptive sentences, courts
would require justifications at least as strong to depart from the
even stronger presumption in the EM revocation provision0'
"Although provisions to revoke probation and execute the
adult sentences are essential elements of the EMJ status, some
62MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 260B.130(5) (West Supp. 2001).

Compare MINN. R. Juv. P. § 19.09 (West 2001) (regarding juvenile probation
revocation), with MINN. K. GLUM. P. § 27.04 (1990) (regarding adult probation revoca-

tion).
See MINN. R. Cl. P. § 27.04(3)(3)(b) (West 1990).
' MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.130(5) (West 2001); see also MINN. R. Juv. P. §
19.09(3) (C) (2) (West 1995) ("[T]he court shall order the execution of the sentence
or make written findings indicating the mitigating factors that justify continuing the
stay.").
66See MINN.SENTENCING GUIDEUNES § II.D.2.a (1999) (non-exclusive list of mitigating factor that may be used as reasons for departure from presumptive sentence);
MINN. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES § II.D.03 cmt. (1999).
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[proponents of the law] feared that many youths might enter
adult correctional facilities through this procedural back
door. " 67 An EJ youth is one whom a judge or a prosecutor already has determined can remain in juvenile court consistently
with "public safety." Proponents feared that even if a probation
violation is not a presumptive-commitment-to-prison offense, an
E youth whose probation is revoked likely will be incarcerated
as an adult offender. Thus, even if an initial offense clearly
would not warrant certification and a subsequent offense or
probation violation would not in itselfjustify imprisonment, for
an EM youth, the two in combination may result in a more severe outcome than either a juvenile or criminal court judge
would impose if asked directly whether imprisonment is appropriate. While there must be limits to "one last chance," some
juveniles' "adult" criminal status now may be decided in the
context of summary probation revocation hearings rather than
via full-blown certification hearings. Although the legislature
and the Sentencing Guidelines Commission recognized that the
EJ provisions could have the largest potential bedspace-impact
on adult facilities, they were unable to estimate the precise effect of the changes because they had no basis to determine the
rate at which judges would revoke EJJ youth's probation and
execute their stayed adult prison sentences."' This study provides a partial answer to various questions about the administration of these EM provisions.
Feld, Violent Youth and PublicPoli&y, supra note 3, at 1050.
6' See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, BED-SPACE IMPACr ANALSIs: JUEIL.E

JusTicE BILL 2 (1994). The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission candidly
noted that "because this bill includes new policies which are substantially different
than the existing system, it is difficult to precisely estimate the impact. Estimating the
impact of the legislation is further complicated by the difficulty in predicting prosecutorial and judicial practices for these cases." Id. With respect to EJM probation
revocations, the Guidelines Commission cautioned: 'The impact of this [EJJ] provision on the adult prison system will depend on the frequency with which the juveniles
violate their conditions or commit new offenses. It is estimated that the impact could
range from 130 beds (if 10% are revoked) to 326 (if 25% are revoked)." Id. at 4.
The 1994 Minnesota Legislature requested the Legislative Audit Commission to
evaluate recidivism rates for youthful offenders released from state juvenile correctional facilities. While recidivism rates varied somewhat for different facilities, the
Legislative Auditor found very high rates of re- offending by juveniles and certified
adults, and cautioned that even the higher EM bed-space impact may under-estimate
the likely rates of probation violations and adult confinement. See OrrCE OF THE
LEGISLATIVE AUDrrOR, STATE OF MINN., RESIDENTIAL FAcairiEs FORJUVENIIE OFFENDERS

62-75 (1995).
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III.
DATA AND METHODS
This study evaluates the implementation of the certification
and blended sentencing laws in Hennepin County (Minneapolis), Minnesota. Hennepin County is the most populous county
in the state, experiences the largest volume and rate of youth
crime, and accounts for about one-third of all of the EJJ and
certification cases in Minnesota.6
Our data begins at the point at which the prosecuting attorney decides to file either an EM motion or a certification modon in conjunction with a delinquency petition. To be eligible
for either an EM or waiver disposition, a youth must be fourteen
to seventeen years of age and charged with a felony-level crime.
We identified juveniles by the type of motion-EM or certification-that prosecutors filed initially. As Table 1 indicated,
prosecutors and judges could certify or designate a youth for an
EJJ prosecution under five separate pathways. Each youth's juvenile court file contained information about the particular
route or pathway to certification or EJJ status, the judicial decision or plea agreement, the level, type and degree of current offense, prior delinquency offenses, court services reports and
evaluations, and any subsequent revocation and re-sentencing
information. Trained graduate students read and electronically
recorded court files. In addition, the coders used computerized
systems in both juvenile and criminal courts to check subsequent revocation proceedings and recidivism.
This study reports complete analyses of data for the first
three years-1995 through 1997-during which the new law has
been in effect in order to allow sufficient time to elapse to include revocation information. We have collected initial information on the first four years of juveniles motioned in
Hennepin County and will follow and analyze data from subsequent years (1998 and later) after enough time has passed to
include post-disposition outcomes.
The indicators and data we collected parallel closely our
previous research on youths against whom prosecutors filed motions for transfer under the traditional judicial waiver statute
and enable us to evaluate how the new law affected the charace.g., MINN. SUPREME COURT, STATE COURT ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE, JUVENILE
JUSTICE ISSUES: STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF EU AND ADULT CERTIFICATION DATA 1996,
61 See,

1997, & 1998 (2000). In 1998, for example, Hennepin County accounted for 34.4%
of all EM
J cases and 30.3% of all certification cases in Minnesota. Id. at tbl.8.
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teristics of waived youths and their subsequent court careers.""
We collected extensive information on offense, sociodemographic, and court processing variables: current offense
(degree, type and level of severity of alleged offense, role of the
defendant in the offense, victim injury, weapon use and dispositional information), delinquency history (degree, type and level
of adjudicated offenses, affiliated sanctioning, prior out-ofhome placements or treatment opportunities), demographic information on the defendant (age, gender and race), and justice
system variables (which judge heard the case, whether the hearing involved a trial or plea agreement, recommendations of
probation officer and psychologist). In addition, we conducted
group interviews with juvenile court judges, legislators, task
force members, prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation officers, and court psychologists. We explored with the juvenile justice personnel the aspects of the presumptive certification and
EJ laws with which they were satisfied and dissatisfied.
Our analysis begins with an examination of the implementation of the new legislation. We then compare what occurred
under the previous waiver legislation and under the new
blended sentencing and certification laws. We compare the
characteristics of youths against whom prosecutors currently
filed waiver or EJ motions with the previous transfer practice in
order to assess whether the new presumptive certification and
EM laws or prosecutorial practices identified a different type of
youth than those whom prosecutors or judges previously transferred. We also compare the characteristics of youths against
whom prosecutors currently filed EJ versus certification mon

MARCY

RASMUSSEN

PODKOPACZ,

HENNFPIN

CrfY

DEP'T

OF

COMlUNrIY

CORRECnONS, JuvENIx, Rm aEcE STUDY (1994); Podkopacz & Feld, Judicial Waiver,
supra note 7.

One area we excluded for the current population of youth was the in-depth openended assessment of all significant life events prominent in the juvenile's family life.
The reason we chose to omit these indicators was based on the fact that previously we
found little variance in the family stability/instability scales. In general all of the
youth motioned under the old legislation fell closely together on the instability end
of the continuum. In addition, collecting this information added an extra 2 hours to
each file examined.
Other differences include additional information we chose to collect for this
population including the culpability of the defendant (were they a main perpetrator
of the crime or not). We also collected arrest and detention (A&D) information and
bench warrant (BW) information on the current population since these could lead to
revocations of stayed prison sentences.
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tions to discern the differences between the youths identified
for enhanced juvenile sanctions and those whom they deemed
appropriate of adult prosecution. We compare judicial decisions under both laws to assess whether the new juvenile procedures continue to reflect the subjectivity characteristic of the
prior waiver process. Finally, we analyze revocation rates for
both EM and transferred youths to assess the effectiveness of this
alternative sentencing strategy.
IV.

FINDINGS

During the seven years encompassed in our previous sample
(1986-1992), Hennepin County prosecutors filed motions for
adult certification against a total 330 youth.1 These youth all
faced the possibility of transfer to adult criminal court. Under
the new blended sentencing laws, prosecutors selected 504
youth to face adult sentences in the first three years alone
(1995-1997). During this period, prosecutors filed motions for
adult certification against 323 youths who faced the initial possibility of transfer, and they filed an additional 181 EJJ motions
against youths who faced the possibility of adult sanctions only if
they failed their juvenile probationary dispositions. Our analyses will compare both types of youths-EU and certificationwith each other and with those against whom prosecutors previously filed transfer motions.
A. NEW OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO PROSECUTORS UNDER BLENDED
SENTENCING

Table 1 shows the pathways or options that a prosecuting attorney can choose for delinquent youths. The EJM and certification criteria for Options 1 and 3-ages 14 through 17 and
charged with any felony-are identical to each other, as are the
criteria for Options 2 and 4-ages 16 through 17 and charged
with a presumptive commitment to prison offense. Despite the
similarity of criteria, the Juvenile Justice Task Force that recommended the presumptive certification and EJJ laws and the
legislature expected that prosecutors would differentiate among
youths charged with similar offenses for EMJ versus certification
on the basis of their age, the qualitative seriousness of their of71 See Podkopacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra note 7, at 463 tbl.1; Podkopacz
&
Feld, JudicialWaiver, supra note 7, at 118 tbl.1

2001]

WAIVER REFORM & SENTENCING

1021

fense, their degree of criminal participation, and their prior delinquency history.7 The Task Force expected that prosecutors
would file certification motions against older youth with more
serious crimes and more extensive delinquency histories and
file EJ motions against younger juveniles or those with less serious or no delinquency history.
Although youths against whom prosecutors filed a certification motion faced the immediate prospect of criminal conviction and sentencing, the most severe sentence youths against
whom prosecutors filed an EfJ motion was a stayed adult prison
sentence. Table 2 shows that prosecutors chose to file only a
motion for Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile prosecution against
181 youth, or 36%, of the total offenders in our sample (Options 1 and 2). These youth remain in juvenile court if they
successfully meet the juvenile placement criteria and fulfill the
conditions of their juvenile probation, which can continue until
age 21. The ninety-five (95) youth against whom prosecutors
filed E3J motions under Option 1 enjoy the right to a judicial
hearing on their threat to "public safety" and face two possible
outcomes: (a) remaining in juvenile court as an ordinary delinquent until age 19, or (b) having the court designate the youth
as an EMi with a stayed criminal sentence and juvenile court dispositional jurisdiction continuing until age 21. Under Option
2, the prosecutors designate as EJJs those youths aged 16 or 17
and charged with a presumptive commitment to prison offense
without any additional judicial review. Under this option,
prosecutors designated eighty-six (86) youths as Es without any
additional judicial evaluation of their threat to "public safety."
In addition to the 181 EM motions, prosecutors filed certification motions against an additional 323 youths (Options 3 - 5),
or about 108 per year. This represents a substantial increase
over previous waiver practices, which averaged about 47 certification motions per year. 3 The possible outcomes of these certification motions vary, depending upon in which category the
prosecutor charges the youth. For the 82 youths against whom
prosecutors filed certification motions under Option 3-ages 14
through 17 and any felony-three possible outcomes obtained:
(a) remaining injuvenile court as an ordinary delinquent; (b)
72SeeFeld, Vzolent Youth and PublicPolicy, supra note 3, at 1038-51.
See Podkopacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra note 7; Podkopacz & Feld, Judicial
Waiver supra note 7.
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having the juvenile court sentence the youth in the EJ category;
or (c) transferring the youth to criminal court for prosecution
as an adult. For the 240 youths against whom prosecutors filed
presumptive certification motions under Option 4-ages 16
through 17 and a presumptive commitment to prison offenseonly two possible outcomes were available, unless the prosecutor withdraws the motion and proceeds against the child as an
ordinary delinquent: (a) the juvenile court could designate the
juvenile as an E5 prosecution; or (b) transfer the youth to adult
court. For the one youth whom prosecutors charged under the
mandatory certification provision, Option 5, adult criminal
prosecution was the only possible outcome. The various EJ and
certification options enable prosecutors to select the outcome
they deem most desirable (criminal court or EJM status) based
on considerations of the individual characteristics of the offender, the seriousness of the offense and prior record, and
"public safety" factors.
1. Prosecutors'ChargingPractices

Table 2 indicates that prosecutors changed the way they
charged and filed certification and EM motions against youth
during the first three years of implementation. Prosecutors who
charged youths aged 14 through 17 with a non-presumptive offense could file either an EM] "public safety" motion or a nonpresumptive certification motion (Options 1 or 3). In the first
year of implementation, prosecuting attorneys filed a certification motion against nearly one-quarter (23.4%) of those youths
and filed an EJ motion against only 10.4%. The county attorneys had reversed this pattern, however, by 1997. Youth aged 14
through 17 whom prosecutors charged with a non-presumptive
felony offense were more likely to be placed on the EM motion
path. By 1997, prosecutors filed non-presumptive certification
motions primarily against 14- or 15-year old youths charged with
a presumptive-commit offense but who were ineligible for presumptive certification by virtue of their younger age.
Similarly, for juveniles aged sixteen or seventeen years and
charged with a presumptive commitment to prison offense,
prosecutors either could automatically designate them as Es or
file presumptive certification motions (Table 2, Options 2 and
4). Over the three year span, the number and percentage of
youths whom prosecutors automatically designated as EJs declined dramatically, from 41 in 1995 to 10 in 1997, while the
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number of youths against whom they filed presumptive certification motions increased by virtually the same amount, from 60 to
98." Of the youths who met the presumptive criteria, prosecutors increased the number of certification motions they filed
from less than 60% of the youths to more than 90% in the three
75
years.
7'See Kathryn A. Santelmann & Kari L. Lillesand, Extended JurisdictionJuveniles in
Minnesota:A Prosecutor'sPerspective,25 WM. MrrcHELLL. REv. 1303, 1315 (1999), which
stated that:

It is also not surprising that very few cases were designated EM as a result of a motion for
designation brought by the prosecutor. From a prosecutor's perspective, it is often preferable to bring a motion for certification, even in those cases where the statute would allow for automatic EJJ designation. The certification motion provides an opportunity to
investigate the child's delinquency history and psychological profile. In Ramsey County
[St. Paul] it is the policy that for every motion for certification a probation officer's report
and a psychological evaluation will be done .... In addition, the Minnesota Juvenile
Rules of Procedure provide a disincentive for a prosecutor to designate a juvenile as Ell.
The Rules require ajury trial to be commenced within thirty days of the EJ designation if
the child is in custody ....Bringing a certification motion means that the case is set for a
certification hearing within thirty to sixty days. This additional time gives prosecutors, defense counsel and the court an opportunity to evaluate the juvenile to determine whether
an EJ designation would be appropriate. It also gives the parties time to prepare for trial,
which is advantageous to all concerned.
71In part, the EM] and certification statutes and rules give prosecutors an incentive
to file certification motions rather than to designate youth as E J . The "public safety"
criteria for either an EM] or certification decision are the same. If prosecutors file an
EJJ motion, the court must hold an EMi "public safety" hearing within 30 days of the
filing of the EJ motion, unless extended for good cause. MINN. STAT. ANN. §
260B.130(2) (West Supp. 2Q01). Similarly, if the prosecutor files a certification motion, the court must conduct the waiver hearing within 30 days of the filing of the
motion, unless extended for good cause. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.125(2) (4) (West
Supp. 2001). Thus, the time table envisioned by the rules requires prosecutors to
conduct clinical evaluations, to assess the merits of the case, to obtain evidence of a
juvenile's prior record, and the like, whether they file a certification motion or petition for an EJJ hearing. However, if a prosecutor designates a youth aged sixteen or
seventeen and charged with a presumptive commitment to prison offense as an EJ,
there is no hearing to evaluate the youth's EMJ status and therefore the "hearing" for
which the prosecutor must be prepared within 30 days is the trial on the merits of the
petition. By contrast, if the prosecution files a certification motion, the time period
within which the youth must be brought to trial starts to run only after the court decides the youth's EJJ or certification status. Given the time until the waiver or EM
hearing and the court's ruling, effectively, prosecutors would have about 90 days before they would have to be ready for a trial on the merits. Thus, as a matter of docketcontrol and administrative convenience, they have a strong incentive to file a certification motion rather than to designate a youth an E3. In addition, if prosecutors file
a certification motion for a presumptive commitment offense (Table 1, Option 4),
then judges either may certify the youth or only may sentence them as an EJ. Thus,
prosecutors have an incentive to over-motion in order to preserve both the certifica-
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B. JUDICIAL DECISIONS

After the prosecutor filed either an EM or certification motion, Table 3 examines the decisions that judges made in response to the cases placed on these various paths. In Table 3,
we combine all EM motions (Table 1, Options 1 and 2) and
combine all certification motions (Table 1, Options 3, 4, and 5)
in order to show the changes in implementation over the first
three years. Recall from Table 2 that the number of juveniles
whom prosecutors charged with a non-presumptive commitment offense (Option 1) increased over the three years of our
study from 16 juveniles in 1995 to 44 by 1997. As the numbers
of youths whom prosecutors charged in this manner increased,
the numbers of youths whom juvenile court judges could sentence as ordinary delinquents increased. Reflecting the changes
in charging practices, in the first year, juvenile court judges retained in juvenile court as ordinary delinquents about one-third
(35.1%) of the youth whom prosecutors placed on one of the
EM paths. In 1996,judges retained in juvenile court as ordinary
delinquents more than half (56.5%) and, by 1997, fully twothirds (66.7%) of those youths against whom prosecutors filed
EM] motions.
Of the youths against whom prosecutors filed some type of
certification motion, juvenile court judges retained and sentenced about one-fifth (19.5%) as ordinary delinquency cases.
Judges placed about half (between 46.4% and 52.8%) of these
certification cases in the "blended sentence" EJ category each
year. Finally, the judges transferred between one-quarter
(26.8%) and one-third (33.3%) of these certification motion
cases to adult criminal court.
1. Comparison of CurrentJudicialDecisions with Previous Waiver Decisions

Over a seven year period prior to the adoption of the new
blended sentencing law, the Hennepin County Attorney's office
filed an average of 47 certification motions per year to transfer
youths to adult criminal court.76 Table 4 reports that in the first
three years after the adoption of the blended sentencing law,

tion and EJM sentencing options and thereby preclude judges from sentencing these
youths as ordinary delinquents.
See Podkopacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra note 7; Podkopacz & Feld, judicial
Waiver, supra note 7.
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TABLE 4.
COMPARISON OF HANDLING SERiOUSJUVENLES UNDER TWO

DISTINCT LAWS
Average Number of Motions FiledJuveniles Retained injuvenile Court and
Juveniles Referred to Adult Court
TRADrTIONAL
CERTMFCATION
LAWS
1986-1992
TOTAL
(N-330)
Average Number
ofYouth for whom
Prosecutors
Filed Motions
Average Number
ofYouth Retained
in Juvenile Court
Average Number
of Youth Referred
to Adult Court

47

16

31

BLENDED SENTENCING LAWS
1995-1997
BEGAN AS AN

BEGAN AS A

EfJ MOTION

CERTICATION
MOTION
(N=323)

(N=181)

60
31
Juvenile Court
29
Blended EMJ
Not a
possibility

108
21
Juvenile Court
54
Blended El]
33

TOTAL
(N=504)

168
52
Juvenile Court
83
Blended EJJ
33

prosecutors filed an average of 168 motions per year-60 E
motions and 108 certification motions to transfer youths to
criminal court. Thus, prosecutors filed more than twice as
many transfer motions as they did under the previous statute.
Significantly, prosecutors filed delinquency petitions against
about 450 delinquents each year charged with presumptive
commitment to prison offenses. Although prosecutors filed 168
EJJ and certification motions annually and charged most of
those youths with presumptive commitment to prison offenses,
significant screening decisions obviously occurred at the outset
because prosecutors filed motions against only about one-third
of those juveniles whom they alleged committed these serious
offenses. Our future research will examine the determinants of
prosecutors' initial gate-keeping and screening decisions and
the factors that lead them to file EM and certification motions
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against some presumptive commitment offenders but not
against others.
At the time the legislature adopted the revised certification
and EJM statutes, some analysts expressed concern that the new
laws could have a "net-widening" effect and subject more young
offenders to the possibility of adult criminal sentences than occurred under the traditional judicial waiver law.
[T]he question of whether the new legislation ultimately provides serious young offenders with one last chance at rehabilitation, or whether it

consigns less serious youths to the adult corrections system without the
benefit of a certification hearing poses a second unknown feature. EMJ
may provide judges with a sentencing alternative for some youths who
otherwise would have been certified. If courts, however, use EMJ more
extensively for many youths who would not be certified either previously
or under the new regime, and these youths violate their juvenile probations, then EM may have a net-widening effect and increase the number
of youths consigned to adult facilities. Ironically, in these cases, a juvenile court judge already has determined that EMi youths do not pose a
threat to "public safety" requiring adult incarceration. And yet, a new
offense, which itself would not warrant certification, ma , provide the basis to revoke probation and execute the adult sentence.

Although proponents of alternative punishments contend
that judges will impose them on offenders who otherwise would
receive a jail or prison terms, "net-widening" occurs when
prosecutors and judges instead draw the pool of offenders sentenced to the "alternative" not from those whom they otherwise
would have sentenced to prison, but from those 7who
otherwise
8
would have received a less restrictive punishment.
Our analyses suggest that the presumptive waiver and EJJ
laws do seem to have produced a substantial net-widening effect. Recall that under the previous waiver statute, prosecutors
filed 47 certification motions and juvenile court judges transferred an average of 31 juveniles per year and retained about
one-third (34%) of motioned youths as ordinary delinquents."
Under the new blended sentencing and waiver law, the average
7 Feld, Violent Youth and PublicPolicy, supra note 3, at 1124.
78 See Norval Morris & Michael Tonry, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION:
INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENT IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 157-58 (1990);Joan Petersilia & Susan Turner, Intensive Probationand Parole, in 17 CRIME &JUsTIcE 281 (Michael Tonry ed., 1993).
" See Podkopacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra note 7; Podkopacz & Feld, Judicial
Waiver; supranote 7.
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number of certification motions more than doubled (108 vs.
47). Despite this enormous increase in the pool of youths
whom prosecutors deemed eligible for transfer to criminal
courts, the juvenile court judges transferred about the same
number of youths as they had previously. The raw numbers of
juveniles judicially transferred under the previous waiver provisions annually averaged 31 youths. Under the new, "streamlined" presumptive waiver law, the judges transferred an average
of 33 juveniles per year, an insignificant difference. The remarkable stability in the absolute numbers of youths transferred
annually suggests a kind of waiver "equilibrium"-the judicial
culture had identified the numbers and characteristics of youths
appropriate for adult criminal prosecution and this equilibrium
persisted despite the substantive changes in the waiver law's criteria, presumptions, and procedures.
Under the previous waiver law, judges transferred two-thirds
(65%) of the youths against whom prosecutors filed waiver motions to adult criminal court.o Under the new law, the judges
transferred less than one-third (30.6%) of the eligible ' youths
to adult court. Although judges continued to transfer about the
same numbers of youths to criminal court as previously despite
the dramatic increase in the number of waiver motions filed,
they now sentenced half (50%) of all youths against whom
prosecutors filed a certification motion under the new blended
sentencing Ef law rather than as ordinary delinquents as under
the previous practice. On the average, an additional 54 juveniles each year received a stayed adult criminal sentence and
the possibility of an adult sanction if they failed on their juvenile
probation disposition. It is these youths, who previously only
would have been sentenced as ordinary delinquents, for whom
the threat of adult sanctions represents a potential "netwidening."
In addition to increasing the average number of waiver motions from 47 to 108, prosecutors filed additional 60 EM motions
annually which exposed an even larger pool of youths to the

See Podkopacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra note 7, at 466 tbl.2; Podkopacz &
Feld,Judicial Waiver, supra note 7, at 132 tbl.17.
8,Eligible, here, refers to those 323 youths against whom prosecutors originally
filed a certification motion rather than an EJJ motion. Juveniles against whom prosecutors filed an EJM motion (Table 1, options 1 or 2) did not face the immediate possibility of transfer to criminal court.
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secondary possibility of adult sentences if they failed on their juvenile probationary dispositions. Juvenile court judges sentenced about half (48.3%) of the youths against whom
prosecutors filed an EJJ motion under the enhanced blended
sentencing option rather than as ordinary delinquents. As under the previous practice, judges continued to sentence about
one-third (31.2%) of juveniles as ordinary delinquents. However, because of the increase in the total number of waiver motions and the adoption of the EJ option, juvenile court judges
sentenced half (49.4%) of all youths against whom prosecutors
filed either waiver or EM motions to the EJJ option and thereby
greatly expanded the pool of youths over whom hung the threat
of an adult criminal sentence.
The blended sentencing option had a substantial netwidening impact. Although the judges transferred directly
about the same number of youths per year as previously (33 vs.
31), they imposed stayed adult criminal sentences on an additionai 54 youths per year against whom prosecutors filed transfer motions. Judges also imposed an additional average 29 per
year stayed adult criminal sentences on those youths against
whom prosecutors initially filed EJ motions. Although the
numbers of youths transferred directly remained virtually constant, an average of 83 additional youths each year entered the
EM status, received stayed adult sentences, and faced the prospect of probation revocation and adult imprisonment. And, as
we shall see,judges subsequently revoked the juvenile probation
of a substantial proportion of those EM juveniles and confined
them as adults.
2. Comparisonof Youths' CharacteristicsunderPriorJudicialWaiver and
UnderNew Presumptive Certificationand Blended Sentencing law

Because our data reveals a widening of the pool of youths
exposed to the possibility of adult sanctions as a result of the
presumptive certification and EM sentencing laws, our next
analyses compare the characteristics of youths whom prosecutors previously identified as appropriate candidates for transfer
with those youths whom they subsequently deemed appropriate
for transfer or for the enhanced EJ sanctions. We report the
similarities and differences in the characteristics of youths in
Tables 5, 6, and 7.
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a)

Personal Characteristics
The age at which juveniles commit their first offense or
make their first court appearance constitutes "one of the best
predictors . . . of the future course of the criminal career. " 2

The younger the age of onset of offending, the greater the likelihood he or she will continue and commit additional offenses.
In Table 5, we report the age of a youth's first juvenile court appearance.0 In our earlier waiver study, more than one-quarter
(28.5%) of youths had appeared in juvenile court prior to the
age of twelve. In the current study, only about one in seven
(15.3%) juveniles had appeared at such an early age and a
somewhat larger proportion made their first juvenile court appearance at ages 14 or 15 (29.8% vs. 21.5%) or at age 16 or
older (25.6% vs. 17.9%). Previously, nearly 61% of the juveniles
had appeared in juvenile court by the age of thirteen, whereas
under the blended sentencing laws only 45% had appeared in
court by that age. The differences in age of on-set of delinquency of youths against whom prosecutors previously filed
waiver motions and now file Ef or transfer motions were significant. By contrast, the age-of-onset of youths against whom
prosecutors currently filed Ef motions versus transfer motions
did not differ significantly on this indicator.
A juvenile's age at the time of the present offense constitutes an important variable in the waiver process because it indicates the length of time remaining to treat and control the
youth within the juvenile system. Indeed, the primary rationale
for the EM law was to enhance the authority ofjuvenile courts to
impose longer dispositions on juveniles than previously available and thereby obviate the need to transfer some older delinquents. Accordingly, we examined the juveniles' age at the time
of the offense that led to the filing of the motion to transfer to
criminal court and EM motion. Under both the prior and current laws, the minimum age at which a prosecutor could file a
waiver or E motion is fourteen years of age. Previously, prosecutors filed very few transfer motions against fourteen- (3.0%)
' David P. Farrington et al., Advancing Knowledge About the Onset of Deinquency and
Crime, in 13 ADVANcES INCUijcAL Cm PSwC-OLOGY 283, 283 (1991).
3 A youth's age at her first court appearance may not necessarily relate to a delinquency offense. Juveniles also may appear initially for matters related to dependency
or neglect, CHIPS (Children in Need of Protective Services), status offenses, termination of parental rights or adoption issues.
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or fifteen-year-old juveniles (7.3%) and lodged the majority of

motions against seventeen-year-old youths (60.0%) whose dispositions at that time only could continue until age nineteen. By
TABLE 5.
CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFENDERS IN BOTH SAMPLES
TRADITION
AL

BLENDED SENTENCING LAWS

CERTIFICA
TION LAWS
VARIOUS OFFENDER INDICATORS

1986-1992

1995-1997
BEGAN AS A

BEGAN AS
AN EJJ

CERTIFICAT-

MOTION

ION

TOTAL

MOTION

(N=330)

(N=181)

(N=323)

(N=504)

AGE AT FIRST COURT APPEARANCE

Less than 12 years old
12 or 13 years old
14 or 15 years old
16 or older

28.5%
32.1%
21.5%
17.9%

14.4%
29.8%
34.8%
21.0%

15.8%
29.1%
26.9%
28.0%

15.3%
29.4%
29.8%
25.6%

3.0%
7.3%
29.7%
60.0%

17.2%
24.3%
30.9%
37.6%

2.5%
9.0%
33.7%
54.8%

4.1%
14.6%
32.8%
48.4%

28.2%
55.2%
16.7%

23.2%
60.2%
16.5%

18.9%
63.8%
17.3%

20.4%
62.5%
17.1%

3.6%
96.4%

11.6%
88.4%

7.1%
92.9%

8.6%
91.3%

AGE AT PRESENT OFFENSE

14 years old
15 years old
16 years old
17 years old
RACE OFJUVENILE

White
African American
Other Minority
GENDER OFJUVENiLE

Female
Male

contrast, after the adoption of the presumptive waiver and EJJ
laws, prosecutors filed a larger proportion of transfer motions
against somewhat younger juveniles (45.2% vs. 40.0%) and an
even greater proportion of the previously-unavailable-EJJ motions against younger juveniles. More than two-out-of-five
(41.5%) youths against whom prosecutors filed EJJ motions

were only fourteen- or fifteen-years of age at the time of their offenses. The difference between the youths' age at offense for
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which prosecutors filed EMJ motions versus transfer motions also
was significant. Prosecutors filed EM motions more frequently
against younger juveniles (41.5% vs. 11.5% of fourteen- and fifteen-year olds) and lodged certification motions against older
youths (68.5% vs. 88.5% of sixteen- and seventeen-year olds).
Taken together, the prosecutors' implementation of the new
waiver and Eli laws identified a significantly younger offender
population than had the previous waiver practices (51.6% under age seventeen vs. 40%) for eligibility for transfer and for the
imposition of EMi stayed adult sentences.
Under the traditional certification law, prosecutors selected
a disproportionate number of minority youths (72%) to face the
threat of transfer to criminal court. Because the filing of a
transfer or EMJ motion defines our samples, we were unable to
examine whether there were racial disparities in the prosecutors' selection of youths against whom to file these motions.
However, after we controlled for the seriousness of the offense,
the use of a weapon, and other legally relevant variables, we did
not find evidence of racial discrimination in judicial waiver decisions." Under the new blended sentencing provisions, the racial disparity in the filing of transfer and Ei motions became
even more pronounced. Over 79% of the youth against whom
prosecutors filed waiver and EMJ motions were members of racial
minorities. Moreover, African American juveniles comprised
almost the entire increase (7.3%) in the expanded filings
against minority youths.84 In our earlier research, we noted that
SeePodkopacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra note 7, at 481; Podkopacz & Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy and Practice,supra note 7, at 155. We noted that:
In view of the disproportionate overrepresentation of minority youths against whom
prosecutors filed reference motions, the fact that we did not find a positive effect for racial
minorities [in transfer decisions] is an important finding. Our result is consistent with
other multivariate analysis reporting that race did not appear to influence the reference
decision, but which cautioned that the homogenous violent offender population in their
study may have obscured the independent significance of race. Our research sample included a more heterogeneous group of offenders, and, like other recent multivariate
analyses, we did not find racial bias in waiver decisions.
Podkopacz & Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy and Practiep, supra note 7, at 155; see also
Tammy Meredith Poulos & Stan Orchowsky, SeriousJuvenile Offenders: Predicting the
Probability of Transfer to Criminal Court, 40 Clmm & DELNQ. 3, 15 (1994) ("[One of
the more interesting results was that race did not emerge as a significant predictor of
the transfer decision.").
8' One caveat is that the information systems have not kept up with the migration/immigration patterns in Hennepin County. We are unable to distinguish be-
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"[b]ecause minority, especially African-American, youths commit violent crimes at significantly higher rates than do white juveniles, proportionally even more minority juveniles will be
eligible for and presumptively certified under the new law than
under the previous discretionary system in which judges emphasized persistence rather than seriousness."' Apparently, this occurred, because the "other" racial category remained relatively
constant between the two samples (16.7% previously and 16.2%
currently). Under the new law, no significant differences appeared between the proportion of minority youths against
whom prosecutors filed certification motions versus EM motions.
Although the vast majority of youths whom prosecutors
sought to transfer were male, the percentage of females against
whom they filed waiver and EJ motions increased significantly
under the new law and followed similarly national trends. 7 Under traditional certification laws, prosecutors filed only 3.6% of
waiver motions against females; this proportion increased to
7.1% under the amended waiver law accompanied by the filing
of 11.6% EJ motions against female offenders. There was no
significant difference by gender among the youths against
whom prosecutors filed certification versus EJ motions.
b)

Present Offense
Table 6 reports the types of offenses with which prosecutors
charged the youths against whom they filed certification and EJJ
motions. Under the previous practice, prosecutors charged a
fewjuveniles (2.7%) only with misdemeanors and the vast majority with felony level offenses. One amendment to the law limited prosecutors' authority to file certification or EM motions
only for felony-level offenses. Under the previous law, prosecutors charged less than two-thirds (63.3%) of juveniles against
whom they filed a certification motion with a felony offense
against the person either alone or in conjunction with other
felonies. By contrast, in our current sample they charged more
than four-out-of-five (83%) ofjuveniles against whom they filed
tween American blacks and East Africans who recently have moved into Hennepin
County. However, discussions with probation officers indicate that this change in
population composition is not reflected in the seriousjuvenile offender population.
Podkopacz & Feld,JudicialWaiver, supra note 7, at 176.
See generally HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VInMs: A NATL REPORT (1999).
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a certification motion with crimes against the person, a significant change in charging practices.
Similarly, prosecutors
charged about two-thirds (69.6%) of the youths against whom
they filed EJJ motions with felonies against the person. Thus,
the new waiver and EM laws' emphases on "public safety" and
presumptive commitment offenses focused prosecutors' motioning practices primarily on violent offenders. Off-setting the
significant increase in the filings of petitions and certification
and EMJ motions alleging felony offenses against the person was
a corresponding decrease in the proportions of youths charged
with property felonies. Previously, prosecutors filed certification motions against about one-quarter (24.8%) of youths for
offenses such as burglary whereas subsequently they filed less
than one-in-twelve (7.7%) transfer motions against youthful
property offenders.
The offenses with which prosecutors charged youths when
they filed waiver motions versus EJ motions differed significantly from each other. While prosecutors charged 83% of
youths against whom they filed certification motions with felonies against the person, they only charged about two-thirds
(69.6%) of youths against whom they filed EM motions with
such offenses. By contrast, they charged proportionally about
twice as many EJ youths as certification youths with property
felonies (15.5% vs. 7.7%), drug felonies (11.6% vs. 7.4%), and
other felonies.
We used the presumptive commitment to prison criteria as
another indicator of the seriousness of the current offense of
juveniles against whom prosecutors filed certification and EM
motions. In the past, prosecutors charged slightly more that
half (55%) of the youths against whom they filed certification
motions with presumptive commitment to prison offenses. Following the legislative adoption of the Sentencing Guidelines'
presumptive waiver framework, prosecutors charged more than
four-out-of-five (83.9%) youths against whom they filed waiver
motions with presumptive commitment to prison offenses, a statistically significant increase in the seriousness of offenses. Similarly, prosecutors charged more than two-thirds (70.2%) of the
youths against whom they filed EJ motions with presumptive
commitment to prison offenses. Corresponding to the prosecutorial emphasis on presumptive commitment to prison offenses
and crimes against persons in the current group of youth,
prosecutors also charged a larger proportion of youths with the
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use of a weapon (67.2%) than under the previous practice
(48.2%). Clearly, the adoption of the Sentencing Guidelines"
presumptive commitment to prison framework and the "public
safety" criteria for filing waiver and EJJ motions focused prose
cutorial energy primarily on those youths who committed violent crimes.
TABLE

6.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE IN BOTH SAMPLES
TRADITIONAL

BLENDED SENTENCING LAWS

CERTIFICATION LAWS
VARIOUS OFFENSE INDICATORS

1986-1992

(N=330)

1995-1997
BEGAN AS

BEGAN AS A

AN EJJ

CERTIFICA-

TOTAL

MOTION

TION
MOTION
(N=323)

(N=504)

(N=181)

PRESENT OFFENSE--TYPE OF CHARGES

2.7%

-

-

-

0.9%
8.2%

3.3%
11.6%

1.9%
7.4%

2.4%
8.9%

Property Felony

24.8%

15.5%

7.7%

10.5%

Person Felony only
Person Felony plus other type of
felonies

42.4%
20.9%

54.1%
15.5%

60.4%
22.6%

58.1%
20.0%

2.7%
31.2%
24.2%
15.5%
26.4%

48.1%
35.9%
8.8%
7.2%

35.9%
31.3%
18.3%
14.6%

40.3%
32.9%
14.9%
11.9%

48.2%
51.8%

51.9%
48.1%

67.2%
32.8%

61.6%
38.4%

55.0%
45.0%

70.2%
29.8%

83.9%
16.1%

79.0%
21.0%

Misdemeanor offenses
Other Felony
Drug Felony

PRESENT OFFENSE-NUMBER AND
LEvEL OF CHARGES

Misdemeanor
One Felony Charge
Two Felony Charges
Three Felony Charges
Four or More Felony Charges
PRESENT OFFENSE-USE OF AWEAPON
Yes
No
PRESENT OFFENSE-PRSUMPTIVE
COMMIT OFFENSE

Female
Male
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Despite this clear policy focus, prosecutors filed a larger proportion of waiver motions than EJ motions against youths charged
with presumptive offenses (83.9% vs. 70.2%) and weapons offenses (67.2% vs. 51.9%).
Another indicator of seriousness of the current offense includes the number of charges pending against the youth.s In
the past, prosecutors charged over one-fourth (26.4%) of the
youths against whom they filed certification motions with four
or more felony charges compared with only one-seventh
(14.6%) of the youths against whom they subsequently filed certification motions. Similarly, prosecutors charged nearly half
(48.1%) of the youths against whom they filed EM motions with
only a single felony offense, a substantial increase over the previous certification practice (31.2%). Unlike previous practice,
under the "presumptive commitment" and "public safety" criteria, even one single violent crime apparently could trigger the
filing of a certification or EJ motion. However, prosecutors
apparently did distinguish among youths when they filed EJ
and certification motions, charging a larger proportion of the
latter youths with multiple offenses (51.9% vs. 64.1%).
c)

Prior Delinquency History
Although prosecutors charged more juveniles under the
new law with serious current offenses, they filed transfer and EMU
motions against youths with much less extensive delinquency
backgrounds than they had under the previous waiver law. Our
earlier analyses of Hennepin County waiver practices emphasized the policy trade-off between a focus on persistence versus
seriousness of offending and predicted that this would be the
likely consequence of the legislative amendments. Specifically,
we found that:
Under the former "prima fade case" discretionary reference statute ....
the juvenile court primarily waived older chronic offenders with less regard to whether their present offense was a property felony or a crime of
violence. The new presumptive certification statute accentuates "public
safety," violent offenses, and weapons use, and shifts the waiver deci-

See Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel inJuvenile Court:An EmpiricalStudy of When
Lauyers Appear and theDiffteren TheyMake, 79J. CML L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185 (1989)
(arguing that the number of offenses with which the state charges a youth provides
one indicator of the seriousness of the case against the youth).
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sion's focus from the cumulative record of persistent offending to the
seriousness of the present offense.

Under the previous practices, prosecutors filed certification
motions against only 15.5% of youths with no prior delinquency
adjudications and only 16.4% of those with only a prior misdemeanor record. 90 By contrast, two-thirds ofjuveniles had one or
more prior felony convictions and more than one-quarter
(27.0%) had three or more prior felony adjudications." As we
anticipated, the adoption of the "public safety" criteria in the
certification and EJJ statutes, shifted prosecutors' emphases
from persistence to seriousness. Under the new law, about onethird of youths against whom prosecutors filed waiver motions
(32.8%) and E.I motions (34.8%) had no prior delinquency adjudications and an additional fifth (waiver, 18.3% and EJJ,
20.4%) had only prior misdemeanor adjudications (Table 7).
Thus, more than half of the youths against whom prosecutors
filed certification motions (51.1%) and EJ motions (55.2%)
had never been convicted of a felony in the past. Conversely,
while almost half (46.7%) of youths against whom prosecutors
filed certification motions in the past had two or more prior felony convictions, only about one-quarter of the youths against
whom prosecutors filed waiver motions (28.8%) or EJ motions
(22.6%) had substantial delinquency histories. While the
youths in our current sample differed significantly from those in
our previous study on the basis of their prior record of delinquency adjudications, the youths against whom prosecutors
filed EJJ versus certification motions did not differ significantly
from each other on this dimension. Thus, it does not appear
that prosecutors identified a more chronic or sophisticated
group of youths for certification rather than for EJJ motions.
We also examined the number of prior out-of-home placements youths received as delinquents because our previous research indicated that once youths exhausted the treatment
resources available to the juvenile court, their likelihood of
transfer increased.92 Once youths received more than three outof-home placements, their odds of transfer increased

8'Podkopacz & Feld, JudicialWaiver, supranote 7, at 176.
"See Podkopacz & Feld, JudicialWaiver, supranote 7.
See id.
See id. at 172.
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TABLE 7.
CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIOR RECORD IN BOTH SAMPLES
TRADrr-

VARIOUS PRIOR DELINQUENCY
INDICATORS

IONAL
CERTIFICA-

BLENDED SENTENCING LAMS

TION LAWS

1995-1997

19864992

BEGAN AS
AN EJJ

BEGAN AS A
CERTIIc-

MOTION

ATION

TOTAL

MOTION

(N=330)

(N=181)

(N=323)

(N=504)

PRIOR RECORD-PAST ADJUDICATIONS

None
Misdemeanor Only
One Felony
Two Felony
Three Felonies

15.5%
16.4%
21.5%
19.7%
27.0%

34.8%
20.4%
22.1%
11.6%
11.0%

32.8%
18.3%
20.1%
17.0%
11.8%

33.5%
19.0%
20.8%
15.1%
12.0%

85.0%
15.0%

92.8%
7.2%

90.7%
9.3%

91.5%
8.5%

15.5%
16.4%
.9%
Not coded
3.9%
35.5%
8.8%
19.1%

34.8%
14.4%
6.6%
4.4%
1.1%
21.5%
7.2%
9.9%

33.1%
14.2%
5.0%
4.6%
4.6%
22.9%
6.2%
9.3%

33.7%
14.3%
5.6%
4.6%
3.4%
22.4%
6.5%
9.5%

33.6%
13.9%
10.0%
10.3%

55.2%
17.7%
13.3%
4.4%

51.4%
17.0%
12.1%
9.3%

52.8%
17.2%
12.5%
7.5%

13.0%
19.1%

3.3%
6.1%

5.3%
5.0%

4.6%
5.4%

PRIOR RECORD-PRsUMPTE
ADJUDICATIONS

No Prior Presumptive Adjudications
One or More Prior Presumptive
Adjudications
PRIORRECORD-TYPE OF PRIOR

ADJUDICATIONS

None
Misdemeanor Only
Other Felony
Weapon Felony
DrugFelony
Property Felony
Person Felony
Person Felony plus other Felonies
PRIOR REcoRD--DELINQUENT OUT OF
HOMEPIACEMENTS

None
One Prior Out of Home Placement
Two Prior Out of Home Placements
Three Prior Out of Home
Placements
Four Prior Out of Home Placements
Five or More Prior Out of Home
Placements
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significantly.9 3
Previously, about one-third (33.6%) of the
youths against whom prosecutors filed transfer motions had not
received a delinquency disposition placement outside of their
homes and nearly one-third (32.1%) had received four or more
prior out-of-home placements. By contrast, under the new laws,
more than half of the youths against whom prosecutors filed
waiver motions (51.4%) and EJJ motions (55.2%) had received
no prior out-of-home delinquency dispositions and fewer than
one in ten (10.3%, waiver, and 9.4%, EB) had "exhausted" juvenile treatment resources and received four or more prior outof-home dispositions. Quite clearly, prosecutors' emphasis on
the seriousness of the current offense was matched by a corresponding de-emphasis of youths' records of persistent offending
and prior treatment.
Although the legislature intended the EJJ statute to give serious young offenders "one last chance" for rehabilitation, the
Hennepin County prosecutors apparently have converted the
EMi law into one that is both a "first and last chance" for over
half of the youths against whom they filed motions. Under the
new blended sentencing laws, prosecutors filed waiver and EJJ
motions against younger and less chronic offenders but whom
they more often charged with committing a serious felony
against the person. Again, although the youths in our current
sample differed significantly from those in the previous study on
the basis of their prior exposure to delinquency dispositions,
the certification and EM juveniles did not differ significantly
from each other on this dimension.
3. Effect of Presumptive Waiver and EJLaws onJuvenileJustice
Administration
Our previous research examined the administrative process
by which juvenile court judges made waiver decisions and the
role of clinical and psychological evaluations on those judgments. Again, our analyses of the implementation of the new
laws compare how they affected juvenile justice administration.
a)

Court Services Reports
An analysis of the 1995 legislative changes predicted that
the adoption of the presumptive waiver and EJJ sentencing pro93Id. at 153.
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visions would not obviate the need for individualized clinical assessments similar to those that occurred under the previous
"amenability to treatment" framework. "[T] rial judges in certification hearings must still determine whether a youth is amenable to an EJ probationary disposition.
Despite the
legislature's emphasis on 'public safety' and 'proportional sentencing,' a substantial degree of individualized sentencing discretion remains inherent in presumptive certification. "
In fact, juvenile court judges requested more resources
from court service departments (Probation and Psychological
Services) under the new laws than they had previously under
traditional certification laws. Under the prior waiver law, judges
requested full probation studies in fewer than half (43%) of the
waiver cases. 9 By contrast, judges requested probation studies
for more than half (56%) of those juveniles against whom
prosecutors filed EJ motions and more than three quarters
(78%) of those against whom they filed transfer motions (Table
8). In addition, of the youths previously considered for certification, judges received full psychological evaluations on fewer
than half (46%) as compared with about half (49%) of the
youths against whom prosecutors filed EM motions and three
quarters (75%) of those against whom they filed transfer motions. The use of these clinical and court resources to make
transfer and EMJ decisions represent a significant increase over
the previous waiver practice. The judicial system used these resources significantly more often to make waiver decisions than
EJJ decisions.
Apparently, the "stream-lined" presumptive
waiver process did not obviate the need for individualized clinical inquiries and actually increased it.
The introduction of more clinical evaluations into the EM
sentencing and waiver process also appears to have fostered
more dissensus among the professionals about appropriate disposition. Under the previous waiver practice, probation officers
and psychologists offered dispositional recommendations in less
than half the cases (46%), but agreed with each other on the
proper outcome in the vast majority of cases in which they of-

Feld, Vilent Youth and PublicPolicy, supra note 3, at 1033.
Podkopacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra note 7, at 466 tbl.2; Podkopacz & Feld,
JudicialWaiver, supra note 7, at 137 tbl. 10.
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fered recommendations and differed only 3% of the time. G As
clinicians made more recommendations about more possible
dispositional outcomes-ordinary delinquent, EM and waiver-

the opportunities for professional disagreement increased as
well with disagreements about waiver recommendations
occurring 10% of the time. 97
TABLE 8.
COURT SERVICES REPORTS
TRADITIONAL

BLENDED SENTENCING LAWS

CERTIFICAT-

1995-1997

ION LAWS
ANCILLARY COURT SERvIcEs
INDICATORS

1986-1992

BEGAN AS AN

BEGAN AS A

EM MOTION

CERTIFC-

TOTAL

ATION

MOTION

(N=330)

(N=181)

(N=323)

(N=504)

PROBATION FIELD STUDY COURT
ORDERED AND CONDUCTED

Yes
No

43%
57%

56%
44%

78%
22%

70%
30%

46%
54%

49%
51%

75%
25%

66%
34%

Juvenile Court Recommen16%
17%
dations
Blended Sentencing-En
Not available
31%
Recommendation
Adult Court
26% Not available
Recommendation
Professionals disagree
3%
5%
No recommendation
54%
48%

3%

8%

41%

37%

19%

12%

10%
27%

8%
35%

PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION

COURT ORDERED AND
CONDUCTED

Yes
No
AGREEMENT/DISAGREEMENT
AMONG COURT PROFESSIONALS

9 Podkopacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra note 7, at 466 tbl.2; Podkopacz & Feld,
JudicialWaiver, supra note 7, at 137 tbl.10.
"Podkopacz & FeldJudicialWaiver, supra note 7, at 147 tbl.16.
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b)

Type ofJuvenile Dispositions
Recall from Table 3 that juvenile court judges imposed
"blended sentence" Ef dispositions on about half (49.4%) of all
youths against whom prosecutors filed certification or EJM motions. This sentencing option significantly "widened the net"
for enhanced sentencing of youths whom judges previously
would not have transferred to criminal courts.
TABLE 9.
TYPE OFJUVENIE DISPOSITIONS FOR THOSE YOUTH HANDLED INJuvENILE
COURT
(Includes only those youth adjudicated delinquent)
TRADITIONAL

CERTIFCATION
LAWS

JuvENLE DiSPOSrmONAL OPTIONS

BLENDED
SENEING LAUS

1986-1992

1995-1997
BLENDED

ORDINARY
JY EtMS

ORDINARY

JUVEIE

(N=99)

SENTENcING

EJJ
JUVENF

(N=105)

(N=240)

TYPE OF DIsPosmoNAL PLACEmENT

Correctional Placement'
Residential Treatment Center b
Probation (fines, worksquad, etc.)

63%
23%
14%

40%
45%
15%

58%
33%
9%

Secure, long-term (18 months or more) juvenile facility such as: MN State training
schools, Hennepin County Home School JMOP and Sex Offender programs) and
all out-of-state facilities are included in this category.
b Residential Treatment Centers include non-secure placements such as work
camps,
short-term county facilities.

Table 9 compares the dispositions of those youths who received juvenile dispositions either as ordinary delinquents or as
E]Js under both laws. We grouped the juvenile dispositions into
three categories: correctional (i.e., secure, long-term facilities),
residential treatment centers (RTC) (shorter-term, less-secure),
and probation. Both of the first two options include a significant treatment component for juveniles. In the past, juvenile
court judges placed the vast majority (63%) of the youth whom
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they retained in juvenile court in a correctional setting-a secure, longer-term (18 months or more) facility. Under the new
legislation, a far smaller proportion of ordinary delinquents
(40%) and a somewhat smaller proportion of EJJ youths (58%)
received the most severe juvenile placement. Clearly, the court
recognized a difference between the EJ youths and ordinary juveniles in their ultimate dispositions under the new legislation.
However, the juvenile court judges imposed less severe dispositions on the EJJ youths than they previously had given to ordinary juveniles, even though they deemed these EEJ youths
serious enough to impose a stayed adult prison sentence.
The youths for whom judges use the blended sentencing alternative receive more extensive juvenile court resources than
do ordinary delinquents. The Hennepin County probation office staffed a special unit to supervise youths sentenced in the
EJJ category and likened the allocation of probation resources
to parole supervision rather than regular juvenile probation.
The office assigned a probation officer and a community specialist to each juvenile sentenced under the EJJ provisions.98 As
a condition of juvenile probation, judges can sentence EJJ
youths to an out-of-home placement. Although the probation
officer contacts the EJ youth during program placement, probation supervision begins following release and during aftercare. Initially, probation officers contact EMJ youths a minimum
of four times per week and gradually decrease contacts with the
passage of time and based on good behavior. During the course
See pamphlet prepared by HENNEPIN CoUNTY DEP'T OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS,
EXTENDEDJURISDICrIONJUVENILE (on file with authors), describing the characteristics
of EJJ programming:
EJJ clients will receive supervision and services from a team consisting of a probation
officer and a community specialist Clients will be highly supervised by multiple face-toface contacts and phone contacts. Additionally, clients are subject to supervision with
electronic monitoring and probation visits from a team consisting of a probation officer

and a police officer.
EMJclients will have an individualized contract that will detail expectations, which will
include, but are not limited to the following:
may be expected to successfully complete both residential and/or community
based treatment programs

are required to attend weekly group sessions that focus on education, accountability, and support
are required to work toward a high school diploma or GED and are encouraged to
work towards a secondary degree
are required to maintain employment for the duration of the EJ program.
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of the extended juvenile court jurisdiction supervision, probation arranges placement in job training programs, mentor programs, and transitional living facilities to help youths acquire
educational, vocational and life skills and to prepare for independent living. Community specialists were created to include
community resources and the parents in the decision-making
process.9 They identified community resources and collaborated with probation officers. In these respects, E.[ supervision
reflects many elements characteristic of intensive probation and
supervised parole release programs which emphasize control as
well as rehabilitation.' o
c)

Contested Hearings
Our earlier research on transfer practices reported that
contested waiver hearings occurred in less than one-in-twelve
(8%) of the cases in which prosecutors filed waiver motions.
The vast majority of juveniles entered into plea agreements
which resolved both the waiver or retention decision and the
adult criminal sentence or juvenile disposition. Typically, the
litigated reference hearings involved younger offenders charged
with the most serious crimes and with very few prior exposures

See pamphlet prepared by HENNEP N COUNTY DEP'T OF COMMTUNIY CORRE-TIONS,
EXTENDED JURISDIGUONJUVENME (on file with authors), describing the role of the
Community Specialist:
The community specialist was created to involve both community resources and parents
ofEJJ clients into the decision-making process. Their input in case planning incorporates
the voices and viewpoints of the community.
Primary responsibilities are:
to collaborate with the juvenile probation officer to provide a second opinion
and/or viewpoint at each phase
to assist the parents or guardian with information gathering, clarififng expectations, developing clear lines of communication with the probation office and the
Court system, and helping the parents become a part of the decisions that affect
their sons and daughters
to identify community resources such as transitional housing, educational programs, mentoring programs, etc., and present options for the EJ clients, parent.
probation officer and the Court to consider.
1 See, e.g., Joan Petersilia & Susan Turner, Intensive Probation and Parole, in 17
CRiE &JusTicE 281, 282 (1993) (discussing the elements of a generic intensive supervision program include "some combination of multiple weekly contacts with a supervising officer, unscheduled drug testing, strict enforcement of probation or parole
conditions, and requirements to attend treatment, to work, and to perform community service.")
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to juvenile correctional resources.' We concluded that the negotiated "waiver" package-deals reflected the courtroom working group's understanding of the "going rate" for waiver
outcomes based on age, offense, and prior record, and juveniles
litigated reference hearings when no working-group consensus
existed about the appropriate "going rate."
Although contested waiver and E]J hearings remain the exception, rather than the rule, they have become significantly
more prevalent under new "stream-lined" presumptive laws. Of
those youths against whom prosecutors filed EE motions, thirteen percent sought a judicial hearing on their status. Recall
from Table 2, that prosecutors designated about half of the
youths (47.5%) against whom they filed EJ motions under the
presumptive criteria (Option 2) which did not entitle them to
any judicial hearing on their EM status. So, about one-quarter
(25.2%) of those youths eligible for a judicial hearing on their
threat to "public safety" actually received a contested EJJ determination replete with clinical evaluations. Similarly, the proportion of youths who litigated the transfer decisions nearly
doubled (8% versus 15%) after the adoption of the "streamlined" presumptive waiver framework (Table 10).
This increase in contested proceedings is consistent with
our earlier waiver analyses that reported that the younger juveniles charged with very serious offenses and without substantial
'0'
See Podkopacz & Feld,JudicialWaiver, supra note 7, at 135, where we noted that:
The contested cases typically involved younger offenders, charged with very serious
crimes, and who had very little prior exposure to juvenile treatment resources ....
Prosecutors charged with presumptive offenses virtually all (96%) of the juveniles who requested contested hearings and charged more than two-thirds (70%) of them with homicide. These juveniles also faced more criminal charges .... Because most of these

juveniles had less extensive prior records, they also experienced less juvenile court treatment intervention.
Our earlier analyses concluded that:
the vast majority of reference cases (over 90%) are plea-bargained "package deals" in
which the prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge informally negotiated and decided
whether or not to waive, and the subsequent juvenile and adult sentences. In part, these
negotiations take place under the shadow of the courtroom working group's understanding of the "going rate" for different patterns of age, offense, and prior record. The litdgated reference hearings, by contrast, occur in instances in which the "going rate" is less
clear. Because age and prior program placements established the "going rate," litigated
waiver hearings more often involved younger juveniles with fewer prior adjudications or
program placement who were charged with a very serious offense.
Id. at 174.
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delinquency histories or correctional interventions challenged
their transfer motions more frequently. As Tables 5, 6 and 7 indicated, prosecutors filed a significantly larger proportion of
transfer motions against younger juveniles charged with serious
crimes and with fewer prior delinquency dispositions.
TABLE 10.
METHOD OF REACHING COURT CONCLUSION

TRADIrONAL

BLENDED SENTENCING LAWS

CERTIFICATION
LAWS
LITnGATED FULL

HEARINGS
1986-1992

(N=330)

1995-1997

BEGAN AS

BEGAN AS A

ANEJJ

CERTIFICATION

MOTION

MOTION

(N=181)

(N--323)

METHOD OF REACHING COURT
CONCLUSION

Litigated Hearing
Child Waived Hearing

8%
92%

13%
87%

15%
96%

C. SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES INJUDICIAL DECISION TO CERTIFYAND
TO IMPOSE EJ DISPOSITON

Our previous research reported that characteristics of the
offense, the offender, and the judicial system all produced independent and significant influences on which youths would
remain in the juvenile justice system and which youths judges
would transfer to adult court. Specifically, we found that youths
who were seventeen years old, those whom prosecutors charged
with a felony offense against the person and who used a firearm,
those with more charges on the present offense, and those who
had four or more prior out-of-home placements all had significantly higher odds of being transferred to adult court."* In addition, we reported that if the probation officer and court
psychologist agreed that the youth should be transferred and if
2

Podkopacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra note 7; Podkopacz & Feld, Judicial

Waiver, supranote 7.
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one judge, in particular, heard the case, then the odds of a
youth's transfer to adult court also increased. Even though a
disproportionate number of male and minority youths faced
waiver motions, race and gender did not significantly affect decisions at this stage in the juvenile justice system after controlling for other variables.
Under the presumptive certification and EM legislation,
some of these variables remained significant, some factors
changed, and some we could not compare directly due to the
differences introduced by the new laws. Table 11 describes the
factors that remained significant following adoption of the presumptive certification and blended sentencing laws. These variables reflect offender, offense, and justice system characteristics.
Table 11 shows each indicator by the type of motion originally
chosen by the prosecutor and by the final court decision.
1. Beginningas an E Motion
Recall that prosecutors could file an EU motion either to
presumptively designate older serious offenders as EJs or to initiate ajudicial "public safety" hearing to determine a youth's EJJ
or delinquency status (Table 1, Options 1 and 2; Table 2). A
larger proportion of those youths who remained under juvenile
court jurisdiction as ordinary delinquents were younger (14 or
15 years old) than those youth placed in the EJ category, many
by prosecutorial designation. Similarly, court services professionals were less likely to have recommended an EM disposition
for those youths whom judges sentenced as ordinary delinquents. Moreover, youths sentenced as ordinary delinquents
were far more likely to be charged with a non-presumptive
commitment offense than were those youths sentenced as EJJs
(38.3% vs. 20.7%) and to have had fewer prior correctional
placements (.91 vs. 1.21) (Table 11). By contrast, the youths
sentenced under the EI blended sentencing provisions more
often were charged with a presumptive commitment to prison
offense and had used a weapon (60.9% vs. 40.4%), had a higher
average number of prior out-of-home placements, and were
older than those youths disposed of as ordinary delinquents
(85.0% vs. 58.5% were sixteen or seventeen years of age).
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2. Beginning as a CertificationMotion
Recall that prosecutors could file a waiver motion either to
presumptively certify an older serious offender or to obtain a
judicial "public safety" hearing to determine a youth's adult, EM
or delinquency status (Table 1, Options 3 and 4; Table 2). Recall that for those youths against whom prosecutors filed a presumptive certification motion, an EM blended sentence
remained the only alternative disposition to adult criminal
prosecution. In our sample, prosecutors charged 240 youths
under the presumptive certification law and 82 under the nonpresumptive certification section.
TABLE 11.
VARIABLES USED IN MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OFJUDICIAL DECISION
UNDER BLENDED SENTENCING
BEGAN AS AEJJ

BEGAN AS A CERTIFICATION

MOTION
MULTVARIATEANALYSLS

MOTION

N=181

INDICATORS USED IN

N=323

JUVENmL

BLDED

JUVENILE

BLENDED

ADULT

COURT

SENTENCE

COURT

SENTENCE

COURT

DECISION

DECISION

DECISION

DECISION

DECISION

41.5%
20.2%
38.3%

14.8%
37.9%
47.2%

12.7%
20.6%
66.7%

9.9%
42.0%
48.1%

5.1%
19.4%
75.5%

18.1%
81.9%

44.8%
55.2%

25.4%
74.6%

64.8%
35.2%

10.2%
89.8%

38.3%
21.3%
40.4%

20.7%
18.4%
60.9%

30.2%
20.6%
49.2%

4.9%
18.5%
76.5%

25.5%
22.4%
52.0%

.91

1.21

.98

.91

1.93

AGE

14-15 years old
16 years old
17 years old
COURT SERVICFS
RECOTMENDATION

EJ recommendation
Non-E.M recommendation
PRESUMPTIVE OFFENSEWEAPON

Non-presumptive offense
Presumptive-No weapon
Presumptive-Weapon Use
PRIOR OUT-roF-HOm
PLACEMENTS

Average number of
placements

Those youths whom judges placed in the EM] category
rather than waived to criminal court were most often 16 years
old and the probation and psychological services departments
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agreed that this was the appropriate placement. Prosecutors
charged most of these EM youths with presumptive commit offenses with weapon use, although they had fewer prior correctional placements than either the transferred youths or those
sentenced as ordinary delinquents.
By contrast, the youths whom judges transferred to adult
court were most often seventeen-year olds and for whom the
court professionals did not recommend an EM disposition.
Prosecutors charged over half of these youth with presumptive
commit to prison offenses with use of a weapon, and the waived
juveniles had the highest average prior out-of-home placement
of any of the groups identified.
The cases of youth who remained in juvenile court as ordinary delinquents following the filing of a certification typically
presented evidentiary problems that necessitated the prosecutors to withdraw their transfer motion. In 81% of the cases of
youths who remained in juvenile court as ordinary delinquents,
prosecutors initially filed a certification motion and then subsequently withdrew it. The significant indicators for these "ordinary delinquents" look very similar to the youth transferred to
adult court-they are older (17 years old), court professionals
did not recommend an EM disposition for three-quarters
(74.6%) of them, and prosecutors charged about half (49.2%)
with a presumptive commit to prison offense with weapon use.
These youth had a higher average number of prior out-of-home
placements (.98) than the youth kept in the EM blended category (.91) but not as many as the transferred youth (1.93).
3. MultivariateAnalysis ofJudicialDecision

Because prosecutors' choice of EJJ or waiver motions implicate different dispositional options, we analyzed two separate
logistic regression equations. For youths who began the process
as an EM motion, a binary logistic regression is appropriate because the dependent variable has only two options: retain the
youth in juvenile court as an ordinary delinquent or place him
in the blended EM category. By contrast, the youth against
whom prosecutors file certification motions face three distinct
judicial outcomes: retain in juvenile court as an ordinary delinquent, place in the blended EJJ category, or transfer to adult
court. For this analysis, multinomial logistic regression is appropriate. Table 12 shows the results of using the same indicators for the two different populations in our study.
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a)

EJJ Motions
The column on the left shows the results for those youths
against whom prosecutors filed an EM motion. As we saw in Table 11, fourteen and fifteen year old youths had significantly increased odds (1.853) of being sentenced in juvenile court as
ordinary delinquents rather than as E~s when compared with
seventeen year-old juveniles after controlling for the other factors in the model. Youths for whom court professionals recommended placement in the blended EJM category had
significantly decreased odds (-1.918) of being sentenced in juvenile court as ordinary delinquents. Youths whom prosecutors
charged with non-presumptive commit to prison offenses enjoyed significantly increased odds (2.016) of being sentenced
in juvenile court as ordinary delinquents. Finally, youths who
had more prior out-of-home placements had significantly decreased odds (-.298) of being sentenced in juvenile court as ordinary delinquents. Thus, when prosecutors filed EJ motions,
the youths sentenced as delinquents rather than as E]Js tended
to be: younger, charged with a non-presumptive commit to
prison present offense, with fewer out-of-home placements prior
to this offense, and for whom court professionals recommended
sentencing as ordinary delinquents. In part, this pattern reflects
the fact that prosecutors automatically designated nearly half
(47.5%) of the EJ youths under the presumptive commitment
criteria (Table 2).
b)

Certification Motions
Table 12 presents three columns for those youths against
whom prosecutors filed certification motions-one for each of
the possible comparison outcomes. First, we compare the
youths whom judges placed in the blended EM category and
those whom they transferred to adult court (the middle category). Sixteen year-old youths had significantly increased odds
(.818) of being placed in the EMJ category rather than being
transferred when compared with seventeen year-old youths. If
the court services professionals recommended a youth's placement into the blended EMU category, then the youth had significantly increased odds (2.513) of receiving an EMJ disposition
rather than being transferred. The youth with more previous
out-of-home placements had reduced odds (-.172) of being
placed in the EU category rather than being transferred. Those
youths who did not use a weapon or whom prosecutors did not
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12.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES UNDER BLENDED SENTENCING
Starting as an

Starting as a

EJJ Motion
Binomial
Logistic
Regression
N=181

Certification Motion
Multinomial Logistic
Regression
N=323

Juvenile

Juvnie

EJ

Ell

Versus
E7

Vearus
Adult

Versus
Adult

Versus
Juvenile

Judicial Decision

p
B

(B)

-.164

Intercept

Exp
B

(B)

-.429

.

Exp

Exp
B

(B)

B

.006

B)

.365

Age at Offense
14-15 years old at
offense
16 years old at offense
17 years old
(comparison)
Court Services
Recommendation
Blended Sentence
Agreement
Other (comparison)

1.853'

6.381

.347

1.415

.009

.999

-.348

.706

.323
0

.724

.104
0

1.110

.818,
0

2.266

.714'
0

2.042

-1.918'

.147

.993

2.700

2.513"

12.345

0

0

0

1.520

.

0

4.572

Offense

Characteristics
Non-presumptive

2.016'

7.508

.649

1.914

-1.250*

.286

-1.900,

.150

.562

1.754

-.134

.875

-.735W

.480

-.601

.548

offense
Presumptive offenseNo weapon
Presumptive-Weapon
(comparison)
Prior out-of-home
placements

0

-.298

0

.742

-.286'

0

0

.752

-.172'

.842

-2 Log Likelihood

118.158

226.950

Chi-Square

57.691

129.132

.000

.000

p (Chi-Square)
. p<.01I, b.p<. 05,

' p<.10

.114

1.121
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charge with a presumptive commit offense had reduced odds
(-1.250 and -.735, respectively) of being sentenced in the EMJ
category rather than being transferred.
The next column compares those juveniles sentenced as EJM
youths with those sentenced in juvenile court as ordinary delinquents. Sixteen year-old youths had increased odds (.714) of
being placed in the EJ category rather than sentenced as delinquents compared with seventeen year-old youths. When court
services professionals recommended a youth's placement in the
EU category, the odds of that happening increased significantly
(1.520). Finally, youth whom prosecutors charged with a nonpresumptive offense had significantly reduced odds (-1.900) of
being placed in the EM category.
When we compared those youth retained in juvenile court
as ordinary delinquents and those transferred to adult criminal
court, only two variables appeared significant: court service
recommendations and prior out-of-home placements. When
the probation officer and court psychologist recommended an
E placement, the odds (.993) increased significantly that the
judge would retain the youth in juvenile court. When a youth
had a higher number of prior delinquent out-of-home placements, the odds (-.286) decreased significantly that the judge
would retain the youth in juvenile court. This comparison of
juvenile versus adult status contains youths whose legal and offense characteristics-age, presumptive commitment offense,
weapon use-suggest that judges would be more likely to transfer them to criminal court (Table 11). Recall that when prosecutors filed a certification motion against older juveniles
charged with a presumptive commitment offense (Table 1, Option 4 ), the judge did not retain the option to sentence the
youth in juvenile court as an ordinary delinquent. For these
presumptive certification youths, the juvenile court only could
sentence these offenders as juveniles if the prosecutor withdrew
the certification motion, for example, if the prosecutor's case
was substantially weakened because of evidentiary deficiencies
such as the absence of a crucial witness, loss of evidence, or an
inability to introduce evidence. Apparently, many of these
youths against whom prosecutors initially filed a certification
motion ultimately remained in juvenile court for evidentiary or
trial reasons unrelated to their appropriateness for transfer after
prosecutors withdrew their transfer motions.
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When prosecutors filed certification motions, juvenile court
judges generally placed into the EM category youths who were
sixteen years of age, whom prosecutors charged with a presumptive commitment present offense with weapon involvement, and
who had fewer prior out-of-home placements and for whom the
court professionals recommended EM probation. Those youths
whom judges transferred to adult court tended to be seventeen
years old, to have had significantly more prior out-of-home
placements, and for whom court services recommended that
adult court was the more appropriate option. Thus, within the
constraints created by prosecutors' charging and motions policies, judicial transfer practices appeared to reflect the legislature's intent to reserve waiver for older, more sophisticated
youths and EM dispositions for somewhat younger and more
"amenable" juveniles.
Both models-the binary and the multinomial-show a significant Chi-Square, which indicates that the final model is significantly better than the intercept-only model. 03 In addition,
as in our previous analyses of traditional waiver legislation, race
and gender are not significant variables in judicial decisionmaking. Although our earlier waiver research reported a 'judge
effect,
under the new law, the judge who handled the case
did not appear to be a significant factor in the processing ofjuveniles. Rather, it appears that the "presumptive certification"
law produced more consistent and standardized decisions. In
part, this standardization likely reflects the imposition of the
Sentencing Guidelines' structure on juvenile case charging,
processing, and dispositional decision-making. In addition, during the period of this study, judges rotated from criminal court
to juvenile court more frequently than had occurred in the past.
This judicial rotation and their shorter juvenile court tenure
may have influenced juvenile sentencing philosophies because
these judges brought their adult court sentencing practices with
them from the criminal court. Finally, the number of charges
113ALFRED D.MARS, LoGrr MODELING: PRACTIcALAPPLICATIONS

(1992).

'" See Podkopacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra note 7, at 472-73 (explaining that
under the traditional, individualized waiver law, the philosophy and policies of the
presiding judge affected waiver rates). We concluded that "within the same urban
county and court, the variousjudges decided the cases of similarly-situated offenders
significantly differently. Thesejudicial differences influenced both the characteristics
of youths waived or retained, and the subsequent sentences imposed on them as juveniles or adults." Id. at 492.
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against youth no longer appeared as a significant factor. We attribute this finding to the reduced variation in the present offense category. Under the prior certification law, prosecutors
charged nearly 25% of the youths with property felonies and
typically alleged more offenses when a property felony was the
most serious crime they charged. Under the new law, prosecutors filed certification motions against nearly 80% of the youth
for felonies against people.
D. YOUTHS SENTENCED AS DELINQUENTS, EJJS, AND AS ADULTS IN
CRIMINAL COURT

Recall from Table 3, prosecutors filed certification and EM
motions against a total of 504juveniles. Over the three year period of our study, juvenile court judges transferred 98 (19.4%)
youths to criminal court and retained 406 (80.6%) in juvenile
court for disposition either as ordinary delinquents or as EJJs.
Of those retained in juvenile court, judges sentenced 157
(38.7%) as ordinary delinquents and more than half, 249
(61.3%), in the new EJf category. Table 13 reports the subsequent conviction, sentence, sentence modification,
and probation revocation experiences of those youths processed
as ordinary delinquents, EJJs, and adults.
The juvenile court convicted about two-thirds (66.9%) of
those youths retained in juvenile court and processed as ordinary delinquents. We attribute this low proportion of convictions to certain case characteristics.
Recall from our
interpretation of Tables 11 and 12, juvenile courts retained as
ordinary delinquents some youths against whom prosecutors
initially filed presumptive certification motions and then subsequently withdrew their motions for evidentiary deficiencies.
Prosecutors did not seek to have these cases transferred or subject to an EJ jury trial for the same reasons as eventually led to
dismissals or acquittals in juvenile court.
Of those youths who received delinquency dispositions, juvenile court judges "re-tuned" one-fifth (20%) of those initial
sentence within two years. "Re-tuning" does not imply a subsequent offense or probation violation but rather an adjustment
in the disposition to assure a better fit between the juvenile's
treatment needs and the characteristics of the program to which
the court sentenced the youth originally. For example, judges
may transfer youths from one facility to another program, which
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is more appropriate for treatment or if they discover that rival
gang members already are placed in the first facility.
In contrast with the ordinary delinquents, the juvenile and
criminal courts subsequently convicted virtually all of the youths
processed as EJJs (96.4%) or as adults (93.9%). Under the
blended sentencing statute, the youths convicted as EJJs received two dispositions-ajuvenile probationary disposition and
a stayed adult criminal sentence. For virtually all these EJJ
youths (91%), the juvenile treatment disposition included
commitment to a correctional placement or residential treatment center (Table 9). Because the purpose of the juvenile
probationary disposition was to provide EJ youths with "one last
chance" for treatment, juvenile court judges subsequently "retuned" one-fifth (22.9%) of these dispositions, a rate similar to
that for ordinary delinquency sentences. By contrast, criminal
court judges "re-tuned" less than one-in-ten (8.7%) of the sentences they imposed on youths convicted in criminal court.
Every EM youth received a stayed adult criminal sentence in
addition to their juvenile probationary disposition, which was
the legislative purpose of the EM status. By contrast, criminal
court judges immediately sentenced to prison more than half
(55.4%) of youths tried as adult, and stayed the criminal sentences of fewer than half (44.6%) of the transferred youths.
1. EjJProbationRevocation

When Minnesota adopted the E3 law, the members of the
Juvenile Justice Task Force, the legislature, and the Sentencing
Guidelines Commission recognized that of all of the statutory
changes enacted, the EMU provisions had the largest potential
bed-space impact on adult facilities depending upon patterns of
probation violations and judicial revocation practices. However,
because no previous history existed by which to estimate the
rate at which judges would revoke EMU youths' juvenile probation
and execute their stayed adult prison sentences, the Sentencing
Guidelines Commission could not estimate the precise effect of
these changes.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission candidly noted that "because this bill includes new policies which
are substantially different than the existing system, it is difficult
to precisely estimate the impact. Estimating the impact of the
legislation is further complicated by the difficulty in predicting
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prosecutorial and judicial practices for these cases." With respect to EJJ probation revocations, the Guidelines Commission
cautioned: "The impact of this [EJJ] provision on the adult
prison system will depend on the frequency with which the juveniles violate their conditions or commit new offenses. It is estimated that the impact could range from 130 beds (if 10% are
revoked) to 326 (if 25% are revoked)."'°5
Table 13 reports the subsequent revocation experience of
youths sentenced under the EMJ provisions. Probation officers
filed an average of 1.2 warrants against youths sentenced as E Us,
a rate comparable to that filed against youths convicted in
criminal court (1.3), and about double the number of warrants
filed against youths sentenced as ordinary delinquents (.65). Of
those youths against whom probation officers filed warraflts, juvenile courts judges revoked the probation of more than onethird (35.3%) of those youths sentenced as EJJs. This proportion was somewhat lower than the proportion of certified youths
whose probation judges revoked within two years (43.9%), but
substantially higher than the rate of revocation anticipated by
the Juvenile Justice Task Force, the legislature, or the Sentencing Guidelines Commission. 6
Table 14 reports the reasons why judges revoked the probation of E3 youths and youths convicted as adults. The reasons
for which judges revoked the probation of ED youths and those
convicted as adults differed substantially. The legislature intended for EM dispositions to give youths "one last chance" for
treatment. Judges subsequently revoked the probation of EJJ
youths for leaving or refusing treatment only about half as often
as they did youths certified as adults (17.9% vs. 33.3%), which
suggests that EMi youths availed themselves of the rehabilitative
opportunities their juvenile probationary dispositions afforded.
Similarly, judges revoked the probation of EM youths for committing new offenses at a much lower rate than they did the
probation of youths certified as adults (23.8% vs. 38.9%). Significantly, however, judges revoked EMJ youths' probation for
105
Feld,

Violent Youth and PublicPolicy, supranote 3, at 1050 n.371.
6 This revocation rate is consistent with the revocation experience for EJJ juveniles throughout the state. Of all Minnesota youths sentenced as E Js in 1996, judges
had revoked their probation in 45% of the cases by 1998. MINN. SUPREME COURT,
STATE COURT ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE, JUVENIUJUSTICE ISSuES: STATISTICAL OVERVIEW
OF Ejj AND ADULT CERTIFICATION DATA 1996, 1997, & 1998 tbl.21 (2000).
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committing other technical violations of probation-failure to

meet with probation officer, positive urine samples, smoking
marijuana or using alcohol-at a rate more than double that of
youths certified as adults (58.3% vs. 27.8%).

Thus, judges re-

voked the majority (76.23%) of EJ~s youths' probation for probation violations
rather than for the commission of new
0 °7
offenses.

TABLE 14.
REASONS FOR REVOCATION
EJJBLENDED
REASON FOR REVOCATION
__________________

Probation
Violations

New
Offenses

SENTENCING

CER

TOTAL

ADULiS

JUVENILES_____

Leaves, Loses, Refuses
Treatment

15
17.9%

6
33.3%

21
20.6%

Other Probation Violations

49
58.3%

5
27.8%

54
52.9%

New Charges

20
23.8%

7
38.9%

27
26.5%

Total

84
100.0%

18
100.0%

102
100.0%

*These include failing to keep in contact with probation officers, failing to make
meetings, dirty urinalysis, getting caught smoking pot or drinking alcohol, or failing
to meet other court conditions (attending a gun program, counseling, etc.).

These EU youths were juveniles whom prosecutors or judges
previously had determined did not constitute a threat to "public
safety" and who were "amenable to probation." Their technical
probation violations did not constitute serious new offenses for
which prosecutors typically would have sought orjudges granted
"7 A statewide analysis of the reasons for revoking EJJ youth's probation reported
that 77% of the revocations in 1997 were for probation violations, id. at tbl.26, as were
81% in 1998, id. at tbl.25.

1060

MARCYR. PODKOPACZ & BARRY C. IELD

[Vol. 91

a motion to transfer them for adult prosecution. And yet, the
combination of a non-certifiable prior offense and a noncriminal probation violation exposed these youths to the possibility of an adult criminal sentence. The high rates of revocation of EU probationers are characteristic of other "Intensive
Supervision Programs" (ISP) which also report a substantial
"net-widening" effect of intermediate sanction policies.
The higher rate of commitments from the experimental programs to jail
and prison results mostly from higher rates of technical violations. Intensive supervision programs attempt to increase the credibility of community-based sanctions by making certain that conditions ordered by the

court-including those considered "technical" in nature-are monitored and enforced and violations punished.

Depending on how se-

verely ISP staff (and their respective courts) choose to treat8 ISP
infractions, commitments to prison andjails may rise significantly.1

Revocations for technical violations more likely represent the effects of intensive supervision rather than additional criminal activity. "Intensive supervision program clients are subject to
much closer surveillance than others under supervision, and
more of their violations may come to official attention. " 'O'
When judges revoke a youth's probation, they have the option of imposing new conditions of probation, for example, a
commitment to the county workhouse-a county jail-like facility
for a period of confinement of one year or less-or executing
the stayed adult criminal sentence and committing the youth to
prison for the duration of the stayed sentence. Table 15 reports
the sentences that EM and certified youths received after judges
revoked their prior probation. Recall that fewer than half
(44.6%) of youths convicted as adults received stayed prison
sentences and judges revoked the probation of nearly half
(43.9%) of those adult probationers within two years (Table
13). Every Eff youth received a stayed adult criminal sentence
and judges revoked the probation of more than one-third
(35.3%) of those youths within two years.
When judges revoked certified youths' adult probation, they
sentenced nearly three-quarter (72.2%) of those youths to
prison. By contrast, when judges revoked EJJ youths' probation,

'0 Petersilia and Turner, Intensive Probationand Parole,supra note at 76, at 306-07.
Id. at 311-12.
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they committed about half of the youths (51.2%) to the workhouse and sent the other half (48.8%) to prison."' Interestingly, the reasons why judges revoked EM youths' probation did
not appreciably affect whether they subsequently sentenced
them to prison or the workhouse. For example, judges sentenced about half (55%) of the EM youths whose probation was
revoked because of the filing of new charges to prison and
committed the other half (45%) to the workhouse. Similarly,
judges sentenced about half (49%) of the E youths whose
probation was revoked for committing probation violations to
prison and the other half to the work house (51%). By contrast,
for every category of probation revocation of certified youths,
judges sentenced two-thirds or more to prison rather than the
workhouse, including four-of-five (80%) of those revoked for
technical probation violations. On the one hand, this suggests
that judges' revocation practices were somewhat more tolerant
of EJJ youths' violations than they were of certified adults. On
the other hand, however, judges did sentence about half of the
EM youths whose probation they revoked to prison and imposed
nearly three-quarters (73.2%) of these imprisonments for noncriminal probation violations.
2. Eff ProbationRevocation, "Net-Widening,"and the Back Doorto Prison

It is important to emphasize that the EMJ status apparently
has widened-the-net and created a "back door" to prison for
youths who likely would never have been certified. At the time
the legislature adopted this provision, some analysts warned of
this possible effect:
Although provisions to revoke probation and execute the adult sentences are essential elements of the E status, some Task Force members
feared that many youths might enter adult facilities through this procedural back door. An EM youth is one whom a judge or a prosecutor already determined can be retained in juvenile court consistently with
public safety. And yet, even if a new probation violation is not a pre"oData on EJJ probation revocations throughout the state report comparable results. For example, of the adult sentences executed in 1997 EJJ revocations, 77%
were for probation violations and 23% were for new offenses. Of the probation violation, judges sentenced 43% to prison and 50% to a jail or workhouse. Of those revoked for a new offense, half were sentenced to prison and the other half to jail or a
workhouse. MINN. SUPREME COURT, STATE COURT ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE, JUVENILE
JUSTICE ISSUES: STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF Ej AND ADULT CERTIFICATION DATA 1996,
1997, & 1998 tbl.28 (2000).
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sumptive-commitment-to-prison offense, he or she will likely be incarcerated as an adult offender. While there must be limits to "one last
chance," some juveniles' "adult" status may now be decided in the context of summary probation revocation hearings rather than certification
hearings.

Our findings confirm these concerns. Judges initially sentenced youths against whom prosecutors filed certification motions to EMJ blended sentences because they had determined
that they did not constitute a threat to "public safety" and were
"amenable to probation." And the types of violations for which
judges subsequently revoked their probation were for technical
probation violations rather than for offenses for which prosecutors initially would have filed a certification motion or for which
judges initially would sentence an offender to prison. But, the
combination of an initial EM status and a subsequent probation
revocation consigned a substantial number of juveniles to
prison who likely would not have been waived or imprisoned
under the previous waiver law or in the context of a "public
safety" certification hearing.
Recall, judges certified for criminal prosecution an average
of about 33 youths each year (98 total). During the same period, through the "back door" of a probation revocation hearing, judges sentenced nearly as many (84) youths who never
received a certification hearing to the workhouse or to prison
and thereby nearly doubled the total numbers of youths confined in adult correctional facilities as under the previous practice.
Table 16 summarizes the characteristics of certified youths
imprisoned under the traditional waiver statute, under the new
"presumptive" certification statute, and those E J youths whose
probation judges revoked and then incarcerated as adults. As
we noted earlier, the youths against whom prosecutors currently
filed certification motions tended to be somewhat younger and
with fewer prior correctional interventions than under the previous waiver practice (Tables 5, 6, and 7). Despite the certified
youths' somewhat less chronic record than previously, juvenile
court judges transferred virtually identical numbers of youths
previously, 31, and currently, 33 (Tables 4 and 16). Our analyses of the characteristics of youths against whom prosecutors
filed EJJ and certification motions emphasized the extent to
" Feld, Vwlent Youth and PublicPolicy, supra note 3, at 1050.
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which the former were even younger (Table 5) and had committed less serious offenses (Table 6) than the latter. Moreover,
we noted that judges revoked the probation of E3 youths primarily for probation violations (76.2%) rather than for new offenses (23.8%) (Table 14).
When we compare the characteristics of youths previously
certified and currently certified with those ofjuveniles incarcerated as adults following revocation of their E3 probationary
status, some disturbing findings emerge. Recall that EM youths
were younger at the time of their motioned offense than were
certified youths (Table 5). And a smaller proportion of the revoked EMJ youths were sixteen- or seventeen-years of age at the
time of their offense than either the previous or current certification populations (96.3% vs. 89.8% vs. 84.5%). They also had
somewhat less extensive prior records and were somewhat older
at the time of their firstjuvenile court appearance than the certification populations, evidencing a somewhat less serious
criminal background. On the other hand, a larger proportion
of the revoked EJ[s had been charged with presumptive commitment to prison offenses and with using a weapon. Thus, the
prosecutors' practice of routinely filing "presumptive certification" motions meant that many youths who would not have
been certified in the past and whom judges determined were
inappropriate for transfer would be relegated automatically to
an EM status. Because every EM youth received a stayed criminal
sentence, when the judges revoked their probation, they sent
nearly half (48.8%) of these youths to prison. And recall, too,
that the vast majority of these revocations were not the result of
new criminal charges. As a result, judges sent nearly as many
youths to jail or prison following judicial revocations of EM probation as they did directly through certification proceedings (28
vs. 33). And, these EM youths were offenders whom judges already had concluded in the context of a waiver hearing were inappropriate candidates for adult criminal prosecution and
sentencing.
V.

CONCLUSION

The 1995 amendments of the Minnesota juvenile code
marked a fundamental reorientation in the jurisdiction, jurisprudence, and procedures of juvenile courts. Part of these
changes entailed the use of the "modified just deserts" presumptive framework of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines to
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structure the most important juvenile court sentencing decision-waiver to criminal court. If a prosecutor charges an older
youth with a crime for which the Sentencing Guidelines presume commitment to prison, the new statute creates a presumption of certification.
It shifts judicial focus from clinical
subjectivity and an offender's "amenability to treatment" to
more objective "public safety" offense criteria that mirror the
Sentencing Guidelines' emphases on the seriousness of the present offense and prior record. During a time when other states
contracted the jurisdiction and authority of their juvenile
courts, the Minnesota "blended sentencing" law strengthened
and enhanced juvenile courts' powers. The new law created an
intermediate category of EJM offenders whom judges initially
tried and sentenced as juveniles while providing all adult criminal procedural safeguards including the right to a jury trial.
The E3 legislation uses the offense criteria of the Sentencing
Guidelines to determine which youths would enter this blended
juvenile-criminal jurisdictional status. Trying youths with adult
criminal procedural safeguards in juvenile court preserves both
access to juvenile treatment resources and the possibility of
adult sentences if a youth fails as an EJJ or re-offends. A court
executes the adult criminal sentence only if an EJM youth fails in
juvenile probation.
The novelty of the new laws, the incorporation of the Sentencing Guidelines' 'just deserts" jurisprudence, and the interaction between the presumptive certification law and the EJJ
provisions created a number of uncertainties about their implementation:
While presumptive certification pushes youths into criminal court, EJJ
furnishes a counter-pull to retain them in juvenile court.... Because of
the many variables, most conspicuously youthfulness, there is no way to
anticipate how many more, or fewer, youths will be certified as a result of
the new legislation.
Depending on the resolution of the tension between certification as an
adult or sentencing as an E, the question of whether the new legisla-

tion ultimately provides serious young offenders with one last chance at
rehabilitation, or whether it consigns less serious youths to the adult corrections system without the benefit of a certification hearing poses a second unknown feature. EJM may provide judges with a sentencing
alternative for some youths who otherwise would have been certified. If
courts, however, use Eff more extensively for many youths who would not be certified eitherpreviously or under the new regime, and these youths violate theirjuvenile probations,then EfJ may have a net-widening effect and increase the numbers
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of youths consigned to adult facilities. Ironically, in these cases, a juvenile court

judge already has determined that EJf youths do not pose a threat to "public
safety" requiringadult incarceration. And yet4 a new offense, which itself would
not warrant certification, may provide the basis to revoke probation and execute
the adult1sentence.
Again, how often this will occur cannot be predicted in
129
advance

Our data enables us to answer some of these questions and
to compare waiver practices under the previous statute with the
new certification and EJJ provisions. Under the prior waiver
law, which focused on "amenability to treatment," a youth's age
and prior record of program placements significantly affected
waiver decisions. Other things being equal, judges transferred
older youths and those with several prior correctional program
placements. These variables provide a rational judicial operationalization of "amenability to treatment." A youth's age determines the amount of time remaining within juvenile court
jurisdiction and thus the "length" of the court's potential intervention. Exhaustion of treatment resources, as indicated by
prior program placements, provides a reasonable indicator of
non-responsiveness to treatment. Whether or not a youth used
a weapon when he committed the motioned offense affected
the outcome of waiver decisions. The evaluations and recommendations of court services personnel-psychologists and probation officers-strongly influenced waiver outcomes.
The changes in waiver jurisprudence embodied in the new
law were reflected in changes in waiver practice as well. The
presumptive certification and E statutes accentuate "public
safety," violent offenses, and weapons use, and shifts the prosecutorial and judicial focus from criminal maturity and the cumulative record of persistent offending to the seriousness of the
present offense. Because police arrest minority, especially African-American, youths at significantly higher rates for violent offenses than they do white juveniles, we anticipated that
proportionally even more minority juveniles would be eligible
for and presumptively certified under the new law than under
the previous discretionary system in which judges emphasized
persistence rather than seriousness.
The youths against whom prosecutors filed waiver and EM
motions under the new law differed significantly from those
whom they previously sought to transfer. Under the presump112Id. at

1124 (emphasis added).
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tive certification and blended sentencing laws, prosecutors filed
motions against a younger group of youths who began their delinquent careers somewhat later than our previous sample.
They also filed motions against an even larger proportion of
minority, almost exclusively African-American, and female
youths than the previous practice. Prosecutors and judges emphasized the seriousness of youths' offenses rather than their
persistence of delinquency. Prosecutors charged a significantly
larger proportion of these youths than in our previous study
with presumptive commitment to prison offenses, and with the
use of a weapon in the commission of their crimes. Although
prosecutors charged the vast majority of these youths with violent crimes, they also filed fewer charges than under the previous practice. In short, one serious crime was sufficient to
trigger the filing of a certification or EJJ motion. Because the
prosecutors emphasized primarily serious, violent offenses, the
youths against whom they filed certification and EJJ motions
had significantly less extensive prior records than did the juveniles in our previous sample-fewer prior felony adjudications,
fewer prior adjudications for felonies against the person or presumptive commitment to prison offenses, and correspondingly
fewer prior out-of-home placements or other treatment interventions.
When we compared those youths against whom prosecutors
filed certification motions versus EM motions, several similarities
and differences emerged. The two groups did not differ significantly on the basis of race, gender, or age-of-onset of delinquency. Prosecutors differentiated somewhat between EM and
certification youths on the basis of the seriousness of their present offenses with certification motions more likely against
youths charged with felonies against the person, multiple felonies, the use of a weapon, and presumptive commitment to
prison offenses. The two groups also differed significantly on
the basis of age-prosecutors filed more certification motions
against older youths and more EM motions against younger offenders. Arguably, this differentiation on the basis of age is
consistent with the legislative intent, although one reason for
extending juvenile courts' jurisdiction was to provide the option
to treat older juveniles for a longer period of time. Although
prosecutors filed more certification motions against older
youths, the youths against whom they filed EJJ versus waiver motions did not differ significantly on the basis of their prior de-
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linquency histories or treatment interventions. In short, age
and the seriousness of the present offense provided the primary
rationale to distinguish between these two groups of young offenders.
The apparent differences between the EJJ and certification
youths also encouraged us to examine more closely the subsequent dispositions of these two categories. Clearly, the introduction of the EJJ law has widened the net of criminal social
control. "Net widening" occurs when reformers introduce a
new sanction intended to be used in lieu of another sanction
which is more severe, ' in this instance, EMJ blended sentencing
in lieu of certification and imprisonment as an adult. As an alternative to a system of binary sanctions such as presented by
traditional waiver-either juvenile or adult, either treatment or
punishment-judges more often impose Intermediate Sanctions not on those who previously would have been waived or
punished, but rather on those who previously would have been
treated less severely than the new sanction permits. Accordingly:
By and large, judges do not wish to impose the more severe sanction
when a lesser would in their view suffice. When an intermediate choice
is offered [such as EBJ] it will tend to be filled more by those previously
treated more leniently than by those previously treated more severely, if
judges in effect have given the benefit of doubt, and a probation sentence, to the offender for whom imprisonment seemed too severe and
probation too lenient, the newly available intermediate punishment will
be just what's wanted. And, regrettably, there seems to be an anlitude
of convicted offenders to fill all these slots, hence "net-idening."

Analysts contend that public officials and practitioners often use
intermediate sanctions for less serious offenders than those for
whom the program initially was envisioned because they are risk
averse and do not want to be held responsible for the new
crimes some offenders inevitably will commit. " 5

Prior to the adoption of the EfJ law, prosecutors filed an average over 47 transfer motions per year (Table 4). Following
5 NORVAL MORRIS & MIcHAEL TONRY, BTWEEN PRISON AND PROaTnON:
INTERDIATIE PUNISHMEMs IN A RATIONAL SENT NNG SimsT 225 (1990) (quoting
CANADIAN SENTENINCG COMI'N, SENTENacNG REo,: A CANAMN APPROACH (1987)).
"Id.
"
See Michael Tonry & Mary Lynch, InterndiateSanctions, 20 CmitE & JUSTIC 99,
101 (1996).
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the adoption of the presumptive waiver and EMl statutes, prosecutors filed an average of 168 motions that exposed youths either to the immediate or secondary possibility of criminal
sanctions. Judges previously transferred an average of 31 youths
for criminal prosecution and subsequently transferred about 33
youths each year. Significantly, however, judges sentenced an
average of 83 additional youths each year under the EJJ provisions, which included a stayed adult criminal sentence. These
EM youths were considerably younger than those juveniles
against whom prosecutors previously or presently filed waiver
motions and appeared to be somewhat less serious offenders.
Despite their relative lack of criminal maturity or seriousness, a
sizeable proportion of these EM youths (35.3%) failed during
their juvenile probationary period (Table 13). And the majority
of these failures (76.2%) consisted of probation violations
rather than serious new offenses (Table 14). This experience
with EM is consistent with a substantial body of research on "intermediate sanctions" which also reports higher rates of violation of technical conditions of probation than for comparable
offenders subject to ordinary probation or punishment. One
researcher states that, "[m]ost observers agree that the raised
violation (and related raised revocation) rates result from the
greater likelihood that violations will be discovered in intensive
programs, and not from greater underlying rates of violation."' 6
And, when judges revoked these EMJ youths' probation, they sentenced substantial numbers of them to the workhouse and to
prison for violations which ordinarily would not warrant certification or incarceration in the first instance. "If a new correctional program is justified and funded to serve as an alternative
to incarceration and is instead used for people who would otherwise not have been incarcerated, patently, it has been misapplied."' 7 As a result, it appears that the blended sentencing law
which the legislature hoped would give juveniles "one last
chance" for treatment has instead become their "first and last
chance" for treatment, widened the net of criminal social control, and moved larger numbers of younger and less serious or
chronic youths into the adult correctional system indirectly
through the "back door" of probation revocation proceedings
rather than through certification hearings.
"

6

"7

Id. at 105.
Id. at 227.
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Although prosecutors charge most EM youths with serious
offenses, prior to the enactment of the blended sentencing law,
the juvenile justice system adequately dealt with most of these
youths as ordinary delinquents. The adoption of the E provisions and the creation of an intermediate sanction appears to
sentence more severely offenders who otherwise would have
been dealt with as ordinary delinquents rather than those who
previously were bound for prison. And the new "back door" of
revocation proceedings consigns to prison youths whom judges
previously and currently would deem inappropriate for prison
in the context of a certification hearing. Instead of remitting
EMU youths' adult status to probation revocation proceedings, the
legislature should amend the statute to require judges to consider whether a youth's earlier offense and subsequent violations pose a threat to "public safety" warranting imprisonment
using the same procedures and criteria employed to certify
youths for criminal prosecution.
In addition, under the new "blended sentencing" provision,
juvenile court judges are placing larger numbers of younger,
less experienced delinquents with significantly fewer prior correctional treatment exposures into expensive juvenile treatment
facilities. It is possible that sending younger, less experienced
youths to juvenile treatment facilities and subjecting them to
the intensive EMU probation may prove beneficial and reduce future crime and delinquency. On the other hand, recall that
prosecutors frequently filed a certification or EMU motion on the
basis of a single serious offense. As a consequence, prosecutors
may be filing motions against and using expensive treatment
placements for youths who would not have recidivated in any
event and for whom the ordinary, less expensive dispositions of
the juvenile court would be appropriate. At this early stage, we
simply do not know whether these EMU placements are necessary,
appropriate, or efficacious. A research design that carefully
matches youths against whom prosecutors file Es and certification motions with those whom they do not select and analyzes
their subsequent dispositions and recidivism is necessary to answer these questions. This type of study could also help to answer the ultimate policy questions about what types of
sentencing policies and interventions will reduce violent juvenile crime and help youth to desist from their criminal careers.
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